JOHN FENZEL

Presidential Appointees

 

The appointments process has become more torturous than the Founding Fathers ever could have imagined.  In the vision of the Founding Fathers, the United States would be governed by citizen leaders who step out of private life for a term in office, then return to their communities enhanced by the experience and ready to recruit the next generation of citizen servants. The Founders, who themselves left farms, law practices, and businesses to answer their country's call, expected the time spent in government service to be inconvenient, even burdensome. That was part of the obligation to serve.

 

Future presidents will more rapidly assemble the leadership team necessary to honor the election mandate of the people.  Barack Obama will take the oath of office on Jan. 20, 2009. In fact, if history is any guide, it will be nine or 10 months later before the new president is firmly in control of the government. That is roughly when the last members of his cabinet and subcabinet are likely to complete the presidential appointments process. Only then can the real work of the new administration begin.   Since 1960, every president has taken longer and longer to complete the appointments process. Kennedy's top appointees were not in place until mid-April, Nixon's until mid-May, Carter's until July, Reagan's until August, Bush's until mid-September, and Clinton's until October. The next president will be lucky if his appointees are confirmed by November 1.  

The delays reflect many factors, not the least of which is the growing number of positions that require presidential appointment. In 1961, Kennedy filled a grand total of 196 Senate-confirmed appointments. Thirty years later, Clinton had more than 800 to fill. And these figures do not include the growing number of advisory board positions and lesser political posts, which now number in the 5,000 range. The review process has also grown more onerous and complex with each passing scandal. The number of forms has increased, as has the list of questions and disclosure requirements. Just about the only thing that has not changed is the requirement that the forms be filled out by a typewriter. To this day, executive branch forms are not available either on-line or on disk. The increasing complexity of the process has reduced the number of talented Americans willing to accept the call to presidential service.  Presidential recruiters report that it takes more calls to find candidates willing to subject themselves to the process, and more work to keep candidates from bolting once the process begins. The number of initial turn downs is rising, as is the number of later withdrawals. There is already considerable agreement on a short list of reforms that could cut the current delays by several months. These include streamlining of the financial disclosure categories for the president's most senior nominees, and a simplified disclosure form and expedited FBI field investigations for selected nominees further down the Appointee hierarchy. The delays would be cut even further if the Senate and White House can restore comity to their joint review process. It is not clear whether doing so requires a constitutionally acceptable time limit on the process, or a sharp reduction in the total number of presidential appointments. What is clear is that reducing delays must involve a genuine dialogue between the two branches. We know that delays are not the only reason America's civic and corporate leaders are increasingly reluctant to serve. Public cynicism toward government also plays a significant role. Although the Founding Fathers most certainly expected the time spent in citizen service to be inconvenient, even burdensome, they did not expect the process of entering office to be so long, intrusive and frustrating. They clearly wanted presidents to make speedy nominations and the Senate to discharge its advice-and-consent function, aye or nay, with equal dispatch. Two hundred years later, the presidential appointments process is increasingly incapable of fulfilling its most basic responsibility: recruiting talented citizens for government service. More and more citizens are saying no, and those who do say yes are being forced to endure a process that is more torturous than the Founders ever could have imagined. Reforms can succeed, however, only if leaders on both sides of the aisle come together to make senior service more attractive. In this era of handshakes across the party divide, we can think of no other issue that deserves more bipartisan attention than the need to renew citizen service as a basic democratic duty.   Improving the presidential appointments process would not only help the next president turn to governing as soon as possible after inauguration day, it also would make it easier for all of the nation's elected officials to honor the promises they make. And that is an essential element for rebuilding public confidence in government.  The genuine importance of  government service far transcends the burdensome formalities that must come first. The president-elect's transition team includes the White House Office of Presidential Personnel, the Office of the Counsel to the President, the Office of Government Ethics, home state Senators (and House members), Senate Committees  of  jurisdiction/confirmation, and  relevant Senate staff.

The First Major Mistake President Obama is Likely to Make...

My personal opinion about the NYT story below: If the Obama Administration goes forward with effectively abolishing the Homeland Security Council, and rolling those responsibilities into the National Security Council, it will represent the first major organizational error of President Obama's presidency. While consolidating the HSC into the NSC may sound attractive, it ignores the existing role (and influence) that the HSC plays as a coordinating body for the interagency. The NSC is already an extremely powerful organization, but its main focus is international, not domestic. The Counterterrorism Czar (Dick Clark's old job) is important, but John Brennan will not have the needed rank (Assistant to the President) that is required to have direct access to the Oval Office. The Homeland Security Advisor, as an independent (and impartial) Assistant to the President, can call meetings between DHS, DoD, DoS, NDI, et al. Under the Obama plan, those functions will transfer to the NSC-and will take a back seat to international issues.  Such a decision, while perhaps intended to provide additional authority to the DHS Secretary (or strengthening the CT Czar's position), would make effective interagency coordination far more difficult to achieve.  DHS is a peer competitor to its sister cabinet agencies and departments--all of them vying for access, influence, money and resources.  The solution?  Simply reinstate the Homeland Security Advisor position--and, if required, downsize the HSC staff.  If they don't reinstate it now, they will likely find themselves needing to do it later in the wake of a major crisis.... 

 

 

John Brennan, President Obama's likely Counterterrorism Czar

 

January 8, 2009

Obama Is Reported Set to Revise Counterterrorism Efforts

By PETER BAKER

WASHINGTON — President-elect Barack Obama is preparing to scrap the way President Bush oversaw domestic security in the White House and name a former Central Intelligence Agency official to coordinate counterterrorism, people close to the transition said Wednesday.

The plan being discussed would eliminate the independent homeland security adviser’s office and assign those duties to the National Security Council to streamline sometimes overlapping functions. A deputy national security adviser would be charged with overseeing the effort to guard against terrorism and to respond to natural disasters.

Democrats close to the transition said Mr. Obama’s choice for that job was John O. Brennan, a longtime C.I.A. veteran who was the front-runner to head the spy agency until withdrawing in November amid criticism of his views on interrogation and detention policies. His appointment would not require Senate confirmation.

Mr. Obama has made no final decision about how to structure domestic security in his White House, and advisers plan to wait until his inauguration to conduct a formal review. But many key advisers have publicly advocated folding it into the National Security Council, and those involved in discussions said the only real questions appeared to be how to do that and how to explain it without looking like domestic security was being downgraded as a priority.

Mr. Bush first appointed a homeland security adviser after the Sept. 11 attacks, and Congress later institutionalized a Homeland Security Council inside the White House. The adviser holds the rank of assistant to the president, equivalent to the national security adviser , and reports directly to the Oval Office.

“It’s pretty clear they’ve made the decision,” said Frances Fragos Townsend, who was homeland security adviser under Mr. Bush and has talked with the Obama team about the issue. “It’s a question of timing and how they’re going to roll it out.”

Mr. Bush’s aides, including the national security adviser, Stephen J. Hadley, have privately urged Mr. Obama’s advisers not to get rid of the separate homeland security office, warning that it would load too many responsibilities on the National Security Council and risk important matters’ falling through the cracks.

The likely selection of Mr. Brennan to take over domestic security issues in the White House represents a turnaround. Mr. Brennan, a former C.I.A. officer in the Mideast who served as the first director of the National Counterterrorism Center, was seen as the favorite for C.I.A. director after the Nov. 4 election. But he abruptly pulled out after critics of Mr. Bush sharply criticized Mr. Brennan for past comments that seemed to defend C.I.A. operations after Sept. 11. Mr. Brennan defended his record and called himself an opponent of the harsh interrogation methods used in recent years.

In his new capacity, Mr. Brennan would report to Gen. James L. Jones, the retired Marine commandant slated to serve as Mr. Obama’s national security adviser. Dozens of aides now working for the homeland security adviser would largely be incorporated into the N.S.C. staff. The cabinet Department of Homeland Security would not be affected by any of these moves.

The idea of merging the two councils has been recommended by a number of reports, most notably in November by the Center for American Progress Action Fund and by Third Way. Among those preparing their report were John D. Podesta, Mr. Obama’s transition co-chairman, and members of his team.

The report argued that domestic security is inextricably tied to the nation’s broader foreign and military policy making.

“It was an artificial distinction to begin with,” said Matt Bennett, vice president of Third Way. “Homeland security is a function of national security in its purest form.”

C. Stewart Verdery Jr., a former assistant secretary at the Department of Homeland Security under Mr. Bush, said putting domestic security under the national security adviser would focus more attention on those matters, not less.

“It was very hard to get D.H.S. on the N.S.C. radar,” Mr. Verdery said. “You want your issues considered. You don’t want to be off in some second bucket.”

But some state officials are skeptical. “The National Security Council is focused outside,” said Nancy Dragani, director of the Ohio Emergency Management Agency and president of the National Emergency Management Association. “They’re not going to be, nor should they be, consumed with worrying about what’s happening in Ohio.”

Senator Susan E. Collins of Maine, the ranking Republican on the homeland security committee, said, “If the Homeland Security Council were to be merged with the National Security Council, I would be concerned that insufficient attention would be devoted to homeland security issues.”

Ms. Townsend, who held the job until about a year ago, said the council should remain independent, but acknowledged pros and cons. In fact, she said, she recommended to Mr. Hadley and his predecessor, Condoleezza Rice, that they assume responsibility for domestic security, but both persuaded her they already had too much to do.

Still, Ms. Townsend added that fellow Republicans should not use the organizational change to accuse Mr. Obama of not caring as much about domestic security.

“That’s nonsense,” she said.

Minimizing delays in the confirmation process

The process today is getting more, not less, difficult. The delays are getting longer-- measured by complexity, timeliness. The greater load of problems is all on the executive branch side of things. The next administration should take the steps to shorten the process on the executive branch side in the selection and clearance phase so that it can get names to the Senate in a timely fashion, robbing the Senate at the very least of the excuse of saying, "Why are you blaming us for the delay in getting this person confirmed when the nomination didn’t even come to our desks until April 27th or some other late date?"

 

Often nominees feel abandoned in the confirmation process, particularly if they are not someone who is on the Cabinet officer’s team on Capitol Hill or Wall Street and who that Cabinet officer is particularly interested in getting through the confirmation process.  In the departments and agencies, the leader of congressional liaison is going to do what the Cabinet secretary wants, and that may be legislation or some other confirmation. As a result, it’s extremely important for that nominee of the President to have somebody holding his or her hand in getting through the process, which has happened in past administrations but is absolutely essential.

Friendly Vs. Hostile Takeovers

If you define a "friendly turnover" as a political party succeeding to the presidency after an election rather than after some cataclysmic event such as a death or a resignation, it’s only happened three times in the 20th century: 1909, when William Howard Taft succeeded Theodore Roosevelt; in 1929, when Herbert Hoover succeeded Calvin Coolidge; and then in 1989, when George Bush succeeded Ronald Reagan. In fact, if you examine President Hoover’s memoirs, he said in just one paragraph that he decided to retain all President Coolidge’s appointees at the Assistant Secretary level because, for one thing, he knew them all. There are certain clear advantages to having this friendly turnover of succeeding a President of your own party, and on balance it is good thing. The advantages are that there is a continuity of policy, that there is an immediate pool of appointable talent to be retained or elevated or otherwise moved around in the government, and then there are people you can leave in their positions while you conduct searches or clearances for their successors. The inevitable consequence of a friendly transition are that there will be some hurt feelings out there when the smoke clears from the transition. It is inevitable that Presidential Personnel will be a big news story during the transition and the immediate post-inaugural period, deep into the first year of the administration. One essential element of a Presidential Personnel Office would be a full-time press person to field the calls that will come in with the body counts: "How many vacancies are still open? How many women have you selected? How many minorities are selected? How many people from Ohio have been selected?" These can occupy the day of the Director of Presidential Personnel, who has a few other things to do, such as interviewing people, attending meetings, taking calls from Senators, and all the rest.

Presidential Transitions: How to get control of the appointment process?

A key task. A method employed: The President decides, "I’ll pick Don Secretary of the Treasury." Don comes in, sits down with the President. The Chief of Presidential Personnel and key transition heads are in the room. The President says, "Don, congratulations, I want you to be my Secretary of Treasury. You’re a great guy. We’re going to have a great team, we’re going to do this, we’re going to do that." He said, "One thing I want you to understand, though." This is the President talking: "We are going to control the appointments here at the White House, and Jack is going to be head of Presidential Personnel. Now, Don, we want your input on who you want for your Deputy, Assistant Secretary, and such, because it’s your team and you have a part, but we are going to control it here at the Oval Office, and do you agree with us?" And, of course, every one of them says, "Yes, I really do." So that’s a way to get control of it right away. Obviously, you lose that after about nine months or so, but for the first six or eight months, that Cabinet officer is going to clear it before he does anything. So all the names suggested, whether they are from the President himself or from the Cabinet officers, come into the process. Key administration people control the process.

Desirable Qualities of Appointees

 

The five criteria are: philosophical commitment, integrity, toughness, competence, and team player.

Ken Duberstein on the Reagan Transition...

One of the things that we decided to do at the very beginning of transition and then in those initial weeks in the White House was to visiting every Congressional office, all 535. A Herculean Task. Not only with appointments, but stopping in, opening the door and saying to the reception person, “Hi, I'm the new person with the White House legislative affairs and I want to get to know you and I want to get to know your boss. We want to have an open door Republican or Democrat alike. We want to begin to work with the Congress in a constructive fashion.” We split up all the congressional buildings by floor, not by who to see and who not to see. We went to see all 535. We saw most of the congressmen. But if we didn't see the congressmen, we saw their staff, who are almost as important and sometimes more important. We gave them a card that said, “Here is our direct line number. That is an urgent priority of any new White House. The idea of having an open, frank, candid good relationship with the congress on both sides of the aisle is the absolute way you must start in order to have an effective honeymoon. Those are the kinds of things that build bonds. Those are the kinds of things that, later on, even if they don't vote for you, they'll be fair with you. They'll bend over backwards. It's that kind of chemistry that you need to develop in the White House. The ingredient to our first year's success was the fact that we limited the agenda. We focused on only three things the first year: cutting taxes, cutting spending and increasing our national security. The answer is focusing your attention: focus, focus, focus.

Transition from Campaigning to Governing

Stemming Public Cynicism.  A lot of the cynicism about government these days is because politicians say one thing on the campaign trail and they don't get those things done in Washington once they get elected.  Reagan promised what he would do if he got to the White House and he delivered on it.  At the end of the Reagan years, Ted Kennedy said, “Ronald Reagan may not have remembered your name, but he always remembered his goals.”

How you get American public opinion on your side. You have to involve them and you have to be straight with them. That's why credibility, integrity, the moral bully pulpit -- and having people look up to you and saying, “He's telling me straight, even though I may not like what he's saying, at least he's saying it straight.” What you have to do is know what you want, try to govern well, try to win on Capitol Hill and the people will respond.

Friendly Vs. Hostile Takeovers.  A friendly transition is the more difficult transition and a hostile takeover is much easier Because there is a presumption that since you know the Vice President, i.e., Vice President Bush at the time, you could stay on in any capacity you wanted.  One of the toughest things was to start having people wind down, recognizing that they were not going to be appointed by Ronald Reagan’s successor even though they knew him well.  I headed the outgoing transition. One of the things that we suggested is that if they resign to Ronald Reagan, they would get an acceptance of resignation letter signed by Ronald Reagan, not by George Bush. And a lot of people, believe it or not, wanted that.  It was very painful walking through the process with so many people who were about to lose their jobs.

Why Transitions are Important.  The transition is so important because you're going from the campaign, which is the rough and tumble of politics to governing, to putting into practice what you are preaching, what your agenda is. You will blow your honeymoon in the first 48 hours after you're elected president if you don't have any answers for the press corps and the American people on what you're going to do during the transition.

On Chiefs of Staff.  All chiefs of staff should have a passion for anonymity. You are dealing with 535 egos, plus the president of the United States and you can't let your ego get in the way.

Sage Advice on Presidential Transitions

I am reminded of advice I had from an old Carter White House friend in legislative affairs, who I went to see very early on during the transition. I said, “Give me some advice,” and he said to me, “Your biggest problems will not be on Capitol Hill; but they will be within the walls of the White House and the walls of the administration because everybody in the administration, in the White House always thinks of themselves as experts on the White House. The Congress you can handle. It's the people who are throwing knives on your strategic decisions that will cause you the most problems.” That was a very important piece of advice.  The other piece of advice I got is from a crusty old Democratic Congressman who I had known in my previous incarnations. I said, “I've heard you say you've seen presidents come and go and they're not worth anything. And you've seen White House staffs come and go and they are worth even less. What advice can you give me so that I can serve the President and the Congress so that we can have an effective relationship?” And he puffed on a long cigar, looked me in the eye and said, “Duberstein, you're smarter than about 95 percent of the people up here. But what you have to remember is we're elected and you ain't.”  Very good advice that not only did I heed, but I had my staff heed it in those days of legislative affairs at the beginning and at the end as Chief of Staff.

 

-Ken Duberstein, Former Chief of Staff to President Reagan

The Value of Vice Presidential Service to a Transition

A vice president develops an enormous amount of useful experience in how to make the executive branch work. It’s an advantage to be running as a vice president and that the advantages just far outweigh the disadvantages. Because he was involved in that one and he has been around the tracks and he knows how people measure up and he has an enormous number of people to draw on who are either in government now or have served, left, gone on to do other things.