Today, Senator Barack Obama told the nation that he doesn't think it's a big deal that he quoted his friend Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick without attribution.
You see, a year and a half ago, during his gubernatorial campaign, Patrick said that words matter, like "I have a dream" and "all men are created equal." And then, Saturday night in Wisconsin, the Senator from Illinois used precisely the same line.
Senator Obama later said that it was Patrick who suggested that he use the lines to respond to Hillary Clinton's critique that Obama is more style than substance.
Here's my take: Words do matter, Senator. We expect our presidents to lead by example, and you have set two extremely bad examples through your failure to credit Governor Patrick for a direct quote that belonged to him, not you. Second, rather than take credit for your error and apologize, you just shrugged it off and justified your act of plagiarism as "not a big deal."
In fact, it is a big deal. It's a big deal for our children who learn in our schools that plagiarism is a form of stealing. And it's an indicator of character, regardless whose politics you subscribe to. Don't ask Doris Kearns Goodwin for her opinion on the subject though....
• In Washington politics, “ social courtship paid lasting dividends,: e.g., President Reagan’s engagement with prominent Democrats as part of his efforts to win over the Washington establishment, although he had campaigned as an outsider critical of Washington;• If you want to do business with someone, don’t forget the personal aspect;
• “It’s no who[m] you know; it’s who[m] you get to know;” Example, President Bush 41’s success in building a coalition quickly to fight Saddam was partly due to his carefully cultivated relationships with world leaders;
• Important to do extensive “networking and people-izing:” Another example: President Clinton;
• “All politics is local:” To understand and influence someone, don’t focus on the grant, intangible issues, watch what maters most to someone personally;
• Correspondingly, if you want to hurt someone, hit him/her where it matters most, in his/her backyard;
• “The intellectual thinks wholesale; the veteran politician (e.g., L. Johnson, Tip O’Neill) has a penchant for retail, one customer at a time;”
• Some of the greatest modern American politicians were ultimately rejected because their constituencies saw them as more familiar with Washington than their home states (e.g., Fulbright, Church, Gore, Sr.);
• Effective politicians deal with friends and enemies, one person at a time;
• Very effective way to build political support and gain loyalty is to ask for people to assist with money, time, etc; the initial investment gives the contributor/donor a strong stake in the politician; (based on observations by Machiavelli);• Building personal power has three steps: 1) close attention to what motivates others; 2) use the information to map paths to the “hearts and minds” of people critical to your objectives; 3) get people mobilized in you cause; example – Jimmy Carter’s presidential campaign; used outsiders, politically unsuccessful to build his organization;
• People get a kick out of being propositioned; the opportunity to get involved in very attractive;
• But, while people don’t mind being used, they do mind being taken for grante3d;
• Your goal should be to make yourself other people’s asset, to “build your own contributors’ list;” make your cause the other fellow’s hope; the more he invests, the more likely he’ll be to reinvest again;
• Loyalty is crucial in politics; nobody trusts a “traitor;”
• Washington produces paper currency and political currency; the latter is used to make deals;
• Loyalty is a building block of political strength; cementing political relationships with reciprocal support and benefit is essential to success;
• Effective use of today’s extensive media environment does not negate the need for loyalty, e.g., the failed political fortunes of John Connally and John Lindsay, both seen as turncoats;
• The more the differences between the two political parties narrow, the more important party loyalty is to the voter;
• Two related points:
1) Be careful in taking a poisiton or establishing relationships, since they’re hard to separate from; commit to the right person;
2) Make repeated efforts to demonstrate loyalty to people who support you;
• Great politicians remain on speaking terms even with their fiercest opponents:
•It shows strength;
• Offers useful information; learn what the other side is thinking;
• You may need to work with the opponent someday;
•Leave no attack unanswered: try to send out the response even before the attack is made; (counter example; failure of Dukakis campaign to effectively and promptly counter attacks by Bush 1 campaign;)
•Certain issues have more weight than the substance of the issues themselves; they connote values, character, etc.; therefore important to not let an attack go unanswered;
• Effective methods to respond:
o Catch the accuser in a lie;
o Ridicule; e.g., FDR against Dewey and the “Fala speech;” (Dewey had accused FDR of sending a military ship to retrieve his dog;)
o Use the force of the opponent’s own attack to bring him down;
• Men and women who rise to powerful positions in large organizations gain their advantageous understanding of the institution via listening and asking the right questions; (e.g., Tip O’Neill who every day pumped his staff for information);
• Always better to be the bearer of your own bad news, rather than have opponent present it; “when in doubt, get it out.”: (e.g., JFK’s assertive approach to addressing concerns about his Catholicism and its affect on his governing);
If you ever wondered how difficult it is to cancel a defense program, the V-22 Osprey is one of the best cases-in-point. Christopher M. Jones' article, entitled Roles, Politics, and the Survival of the V-22 Osprey may well be the best account of the V-22's turbulent evolution. Here is a summary-excerpt of that article....
GENERAL: The V-22 Osprey is designed to replace the Marine Corps’ aging helicopters. Despite a long and troubled development and testing period, including two fatal crashes in 2000, the Congress, Marines, and private sector have repeatedly joined forces to ensure the Osprey remains a viable weapons procurement program. The aircraft stands as a powerful example of how difficult it is to stop a weapons system once it is under development.
THESIS: To understand the coalition’s effectiveness over time, this study examines the period 19890-1992, when the Osprey survived its greatest challenge—four years of intense opposition from OSD. …Argues that organizational mission provides a compelling explanation of the participants’ policy preferences and the politics that shaped a decision with significant fiscal and military implications.
The V-22 program absorbed $8 billion in federal funding without producing a single plane for regular military duty.
The events of 2000-2001 placed the plane’s future in jeopardy. The cohesiveness of the coalition of diverse but durable political actors ensured its survival as a viable weapons procurement program, and can be attributed to a common policy goal that the participants strongly supported for different reasons.
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Program initiated during the Reagan defense build-up. George Bush (Sr.)’s administration (SECDEF Cheney and David Chu (PA&E) tried repeatedly to cancel the V-22 by removing the program from the president’s budget—said it was too costly and not cost-effective. Still, each year, Congress, USMC and the primary contractors (Boeing and Bell-Textron) fought jointly and effectively to restore it. Congressional budget authority was critical for its success.
The Bush Administration’s search for budget savings was driven by the reality that the massive defense spending of the Reagan era could not continue. OSD’s officially prescribed role is to “provide oversight to assure the effective allocation and efficient management of resources consistent with [administration] approved plans and programs.” Given OSD’s position, the Marines were prevented from lobbying publicly on behalf of the plane—but neither did OSD dispute the fact that the USMC helicopters needed replacement…OSD also admitted that the V-22 was superior to existing helicopters. The budget authority of Congress, however, overshadowed that.
The Army decided to leave the program in 1987—so it wouldn’t be the multi-service, multi-mission aircraft it was intended to be. DSD Atwood ordered the Navy to remove it from their production contracts…more attempts at transferring, deferring, and rescinding the V-22 appropriations. OSD even refused to spend the money Congress appropriated for the V-22. Congressional members announced that DoD was illegally impounding $790 million…suggested that they’d go to court. OSD said they weren’t trying to be difficult, just couldn’t implement the next portion of the appropriations act. U.S. Comptroller General sided with Congress. Said he’d release $1.5 billion to build 6 planes. Pentagon took 3 actions that upset Congress: first, ordered the Marines to reexamine their medium-lift requirement and suggested performance standards could be lowered. Second, the JROC decided that the medium lift replacement didn’t need to meet all of the original requirements (long range Special Operations and CSAR capabilities). Third, JROC rejected the USMC statement of requirements and retained a statement about existing helos being good enough.
Congress was outraged.
OSD realized that they lost and their position was irrelevant.
As the presidential election approached they White House seized on the opportunity to announce publicly that the V-22 would be built in large electoral states as well as the other states with V-22 plants
The Congress
From 1989 to 1992, Congress was a firm proponent of the Osprey. Support in the House and Senate was not unanimous, but it was pervasive…conservative republicans as well as liberal democrats supported the V-22.
Primary goal of Congressional Members: in order to get reelected, secure benefits for their constituents. Offered benefits to their districts and states. Protect and expand employment locally. 10,000 jobs tied to subcontracts alone from Boeing and Bell. 25 states had purchase orders or letter contracts.
Some congress members with limited or no stake in the program simply supported the V-22 because they were proponents of a strong national defense. Some legislators supported the program on the same basis that OSD opposed it (20 year life cycle of the V-22 was most cost effective in their view). Other congressmen claimed that its technology would revolutionize domestic air travel…improve civil aviation.
In 1992, the HASC decided that for every month appropriations went unspent the Pentagon comptroller’s budget would be reduced by 5%!!!!!
Congress had the formal authority to control the budget authorization and appropriation process and, therefore the ultimate fate of the V022. Legislative backing would not have remained as cohesive and well organized without the USMC’s unwavering commitment to the program and the political skill of the contractors.
The Marine Corps
The Marine Corps first defined a requirement for a replacement helicopter in 1968. Two decades passed before the V-22 was approved in 1982 and full-scale development contract was awarded in 1986. This delay made the USMC desperate for the plane. They had lots of problems with their existing helicopter fleet (limited speed, noise, maintenance problems, inability to transport tonnage req’s) and they were drawn to the V-22’s impressive capabilities.
Marine Corps General A.M. Gray told Congress: “The V-22 is the most important advance in military aviation since the helicopter…It is my number one aviation priority.”
USMC offered to forego the M-1 tank to save the V-22.
Strong desire to acquire a weapons system that would enhance its mission as well as distinguish it from the Army at a time when the services were competing for post-cold war duties.
Not only critical as an over-the-horizon strike force, but essential to the USMC’s existence.
Given the level of congressional support, however, the Marines were confident they could refrain from public lobbying and the program would survive.
The Marines have a larger congressional liaison staff than the OSD contingent.
Senator John Glenn (Senate Armed Services Committee) and Senator Jack Murtha (Chairman of the subcommittee on defense and appropriations) were supporters of the V-22 and former Marines.
Marines “Underdog” image also helped on the Hill.
The Marines engaged in a vigorous, behind-the-scenes campaign on the Hill.
The official Pentagon position was accompanied by an unofficial Marine Corps stand in favor of the plane.
The Contractors
The manufacturers (Bell Helicopter Textron and Boeing Company) were the most aggressive proponents of the V-22.
Saw it as a way to guarantee profits and employment in an era of shrinking defense budgets.
They made a concerted effort to control development and production costs. Began without a contract and with its own funds in 1985, reducing the government’s up-front costs and demonstrated the company’s long-term commitment to the project.
Arrangements were made by Boeing and Bell to transfer the financial risk of development to the contractors. Both companies had the ability to manufacture the entire plane…allowing them to compete for production lots. Improved their efficiencies on the assembly line.
They widened the V-22’s domestic constituency. Distributed subcontracts to nearly 2000 companies. Labor unions involved. Got FAA backing (Critical in the long-term) and they even got the FAA to co-sponsor a civil tilt-rotor study and to participate in the test program.
Public Relations Activities. Congressional awareness program…tilt rotor appreciation day…landing on the Mall.
Used every conceivable justification…even proposed that it would be an attractive export.
Despite four years of ardent opposition by OSD, Congress won the programmatic and constitutional battles related to the Osprey. Congress had enough formal authority through power of the purse to control action channels and therefore the ultimate fate of the V-22.
Update: This Time/Yahoo Article, entitled V-22 Osprey: a Flying Shame, appeared on September 27, 2007
Wm. Frey's article, "The Electoral College Moves to the Sun Belt" provides some interesting, although not iron-clad, projections about shifts in electoral college votes. Frey divides the country in a way that has most states included in the Sun Belt... So, would we really consider Washington state to be in the Sun Belt?? It's something to consider as you read his article. Here is a summary of his interesting article...
His primary theme: Internal population shifts and immigration will continue to move a significant number of electoral votes will continue to shift from the Snow Belt to the Sun Belt. The effect(s) of this on elections is not clear, but the largest Electoral College gains would be in the “purple” states--those states that did not vote decisively Democratic or Republican in 2004. (Note: The “Sun Belt” includes everything but the Midwest and Northeast.)
Three Main Points:
1. Between 1970 and 2030 the Electoral College has changed from near Snow Belt – Sun Belt parity to Sun Belt dominance:
• 146 elector advantage for Sun Belt projected by 2030; in 1972, Sun Belt held only 4 elector advantage; in 2004, grew to 88.
2. The states gaining and losing the most Electoral College electors between now and 2030 are among the nation’s largest states:
• Biggest Gainers: Florida and Texas ( likely to gain 9 and 8, respectively)
• Biggest Loser: New York (6 projected)
3. Biggest Sun Belt Electoral College gains, assuming 2004 election results would be in ‘Purple States.”, i.e., those that did not vote decisively Democratic or Republican:
• Purple States are projected to gain 14 electors;
• Most of the states’ population growth is due to Hispanic-dominated immigration as well as large flows of domestic migrants, whose voting preferences could swing in either direction.
Some More Trends...
• In 25 years, 2 of 3 Americans will live in Sun Belt; America is aging, but at greater rate in Snow Belt;
• Effects of the trends are difficult to predict because it involves speculation about the preferences of future generations and sub-groups in each region, and also the issue of whether domestic migrants will adopt or change the political sensibilities of their new state;
• Most important factor for future elections: preferences of the purple states; Republicans dominate Sun Belt currently, but fastest-growing population groups (Hispanics and youth) favored Democrats in 2004;
• Aging population in Snow Belt purple states could be resolutely pro-Democrat (seem as stronger party on issues of concern);
• The significant challenge for both parties: interests of the growth-oriented purples states in Sun Belt will clash to with aging, declining Snow Belt purples and projections show purples will be major factor for next several presidential elections; political operatives must determine how to appeal to both groups.
Here is a summary of two chapters from the book Congress and its Members by Roger Davidson and Walter Oleszek. Davidson and Oleszek do a superb job in explaining the tension between Congress as a lawmaking institution and Congress as a collection of re-election-minded politicians to explain its behavior and interaction with the executive branch.
Evolution of the Congress (Chapter 2): The tradition of representative government migrated to the colonies from the English heritage which had evolved over the centuries. Earlier conflicts with the Crown and the Royal Governors had instilled fear of Executive authority; therefore, nearly all constitutions of states gave bulk of powers to their legislatures...likewise, no national executive powers existed between 1776 and 1789. The 1st Congress (under a new constitution) met in NYC in spring of 1789. Raising and spending money for governmental purposes lie at heart of congressional prerogatives. Congress possesses potential broad powers to promote the nation’s economic well being and political security. The size of Congress changed significantly from 65 Representatives/26 Senators (1789) to current levels of 435 Representative/100 Senators. Congress has matured from an unstructured part-time body of 1789 to a mature institution. Institutionalization has a number of important consequences – both good and bad:
• Good: Enables congress to cope with its contemporary and growing workload
• Bad: An institutionalized organization becomes too rigid; therefore, it can frustrate policy making, especially in periods of rapid social and/or political change.
• Congress has evolved over course of nation’s history and continues to evolve to this day. The last big institutional change came in 1995 with Republican control of both houses.
Congress and National Security Policies (Chapter 15): The struggle over the proper role of each branch (executive and legislative) in shaping foreign policy involves conflict over policy as well as over process. Executive branch is favored by foreign policy specialists. The wide range of foreign policy and military affairs fall within the purview of 23 congressional committees. Structural Policies of National Security include:
• Congressional-Military-Industrial relationships include weapons systems procurement, and military base closures.
• Trade politics include the congressional power to regulate commerce with foreign nations. The Trade Act of 1974 states the President must actively consult, notify and involve Congress as he negotiates trade agreements.
Strategic Policies of National Security: To protect the nation’s interests, decision makers designed strategic policies that address spending levels for a myriad of national security matters. Post Cold War defense spending first went down and then back up following the terrorist attacks. Diplomatic spending is far less than defense spending. Interesting to note that post WWII (1947-1951) diplomatic spending on Europe and Japan diplomatic and aid redevelopment consumed as much as 16% of US annual spending. Treaties with foreign powers are initiated by the President; however, they are made with the advice and consent of 2/3 of the Senate. Congress employs other policy making powers to shape or influence strategic foreign affairs/policies:
• Advising – Advising executive branch on courses of action
• Prodding – Passing nonbinding resolutions that set forth positions
• Oversight – Can shape foreign policy through hearings and investigations
• Legislative mandates – Influence foreign policy by legislative directives to launch new programs, authorize or prohibit certain actions, or to set guidelines. Example is congressional limits placed on President by limiting military or non-humanitarian aid to Contra rebels.
Crisis Policies of National Security: When the nation is directly threatened, national self – preservation pushes aside other foreign policy goals. The War Powers Resolution (WPR) requires President to consult with Congress when introducing US troops into hostilities.
Photograph: Cannon Gallery