JOHN FENZEL

Sanam Vakil :: “Iran: The Gridlock between Demography and Democracy”

 

This article, by Sanam Vakil appeared in the Summer-Fall 2004 edition of  SAIS Review.  Its central argument is that the demographic boom that took root in the aftermath of the 1979 Islamic Revolution has had profound political, economic, and social consequences in Iran.  Indeed, this once modernizing country is now stunted and beset with a restless, youthful population.  It is this demographic crisis that could ultimately provide the final push towards Iran’s political and economic revolution. Here is an executive summary of Vakil's excellent article on Iran's gridlock between demography and democracy...

The Islamic Revolution of 1979 was to provide the end of the Pahlavi autocracy.  

Iran would be free of its colonial shackles and leadership limitations.  The elites alone would no longer reap the gains of the 1970s oil boom. Ayatollah Khomeini promised a just, equitable Islamic society to all Iranian people…in support of his pledge, a revolution was born.  

But this revolution of a society at the door of modernity has failed to materialize. Monarchy exchanged for Islamic theocracy.  Educated political elites replaced with the dispossessed.   Shah’s decrees swapped for Khomeini’s fatwas and religious verdicts. Foreign policy of neither “east nor west.”   Islamicization of the political, economic, social, and cultural spheres of society. Regionally as well as globally, its diatribe a steady challenge to Western modernization theory.  Transfer of power from monarchical elite to a clerical one has succeeded in ostracizing Iran.

Iran’s position as a world partner was reduced to that of a pariah state.  Cast out of the community of nations, Khomeini encouraged his people to go forth and multiply…and they did…

Iran’s population boom:  In 25 years, the population doubled.  50% under the age of 30.  The apex of growth rate in 1986 was 3.4%. As of 1999, population was 65 million with 65% in urban areas.  The average family has 4.6 members.

Iran's environmental impact has been largely seen in urbanization.  Tehran was originally built for 5 million, but is inhabited by 12 million. Manifested by: Increasing pressure on municipal infrastructure.    Environmental and health risks.  2 million tons of garbage are produced annually. Air pollution…4,500 pollution-related deaths per year.  70% pollution comes from motor vehicles, many unable to use unleaded fuel.  Traffic and gridlock.

Economic Impact. As youthful population is growing up, so too are demands for a better life.   Unemployment 13% or 3 million officially (7 million unofficially).  Government must generate 800K jobs annually, but is only producing 400K.  Economy is state-dominated and inefficient.  Educational system is good – almost 100% enrollment in primary school; at university, women outnumber men 5:2.  But no guarantee for employment because gender inequality is alive and well.  Only 10% of 1.5million high school students are admitted to university.   

 

15% of Iran’s population lives below the absolute poverty line earning less than $1 per day.    Brain drain crisis:  educated are taking refuge abroad, thereby wasting government resources and investment potential.

Social Impact is reflected in the prohibition of public interaction between men and women.    Imposition of dress code enforced by vigilantes. Youth found underground market for banned Western music and movies, alcohol and drugs. Prostitution, drug use, rape, violence becoming more predominant and visible. Depression among youth, suicide rate 20K annually.  HIV/AIDS are on the rise. Divorce now commonplace with institution of marriage less important.  Temporary marriage (sigheh) legal, which in turn has spawned a culture of legalized prostitution. Young are no longer tolerant of the “Islamic culture of fear.”

 

Political Impact is reflected in youth who are making desperate calls for renewed Western contact.   With conservative reassertion of power, hopes of political evolution seem quashed as little public protest seem in streets or at universities.

 

The numbers in Iran speak for themselves.  Undeniably, a young, educated, politically aware and restless population can only be contained and pacified for so long.

STRATFOR: Iran's Hezbollah Card

Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and Iranian president Ahmadinejad (Iranian News Agency ISNA, August 1, 2005)

This Stratfor analysis on Iran's preparations for a U.S. attack, by Fred Burton and Scott Stewart, has some compelling insights that U.S. planners would do well to consider in drafting their own contingency plans....

As noted by Stratfor CEO George Friedman, news outlets have been rife with speculation about a U.S. attack against Iran, although the frequency and tenor of the leaks have made us question whether the Bush administration intends to order an actual attack or whether the leaks are merely an effort to intimidate Tehran. There is no doubt in our minds, however, that military action is being given at least some consideration, and that U.S. military planners are gathering intelligence and firming up plans to hit a variety of Iranian target sets.

For almost as long as we have been hearing about a pending attack against Iran, we have been receiving source reports regarding Iran's plans for retaliation. Such plans would be directed not only against the U.S. forces delivering the attacks or troops on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan but also against broader U.S. interests in the region and globally. Indeed, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei warned in February that any aggression against his country would be met with reciprocal strikes by Iranian forces inside and outside of Iran. One of the most recent of these reports noted that Hezbollah terrorism mastermind Imad Fayez Mugniyah has been training Shiite militants from Arab Persian Gulf states in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley for possible retaliatory attacks.

Such reports are intentional reminders that Iran controls a powerful terrorism card -- and intends to play it should the need arise. Unlike al Qaeda, which has been badly damaged as an organization since 9/11, Hezbollah has never been stronger -- and does pose a strategic threat to the United States.

In addition to Hezbollah -- which might be better positioned to conduct attacks in many parts of the world than the Iranian government itself -- Iran's retaliatory plans would include other external surrogates, as well as indigenous Iranian forces such as the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which includes its Quds Force and Special Unit of Martyr Seekers.

If the United States does attack Iran and the Iranians call upon Hezbollah to take action, the organization can be expected to comply -- though it is known for obscuring its ties to attacks and probably will do the same in the future. There are, however, some operational factors that can be seized upon to spot and help mitigate the threat posed by this dangerous organization.

Hezbollah

The revolutionaries who overthrew the shah of Iran and established an Islamic republic in the early 1980s sought to export the ideals of their revolution to other Shiite groups in the region. Hezbollah grew out of these efforts. Although it is a Lebanese organization, it has always been closely aligned with Iran and the Iranian IRGC and MOIS, which helped train and organize its members. This relationship is quite visible in the Hezbollah flag, which incorporates the IRGC symbol of the raised fist holding a rifle. Since the early 1980s, the best and brightest Hezbollah fighters have been taken to Iran, where they have received advanced military and intelligence training -- not to mention ideological indoctrination. Iranian weapons and training have allowed Hezbollah to develop into a powerful military force that can not only compete with its rival militias in Lebanon but also stand up to the might of the Israeli armed forces. Iran also has been intimately involved in promoting its loyalists into positions of power within the Hezbollah organization, while Hezbollah has received hundreds of millions of dollars over the years from its Iranian patrons (not to mention the income it receives from Syria and its widespread illegal activities). For all these reasons, Hezbollah remains loyal to Iran and the ideals of the Iranian revolution.

In addition to its formidable conventional military threat, Hezbollah has continued to refine its already considerable core competency in militant specialties such as kidnapping, assassination and the construction and employment of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). It was a Hezbollah operation that resulted in the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers, an act that precipitated the 2006 conflict, in which Hezbollah employed IEDs very effectively against the Israel Defense Forces.

Hezbollah has evolved considerably since the 1980s, when it conducted most of its attacks against U.S. targets. Today, it is a political party that holds seats in the Lebanese parliament and a social services organization that runs hospitals, schools and orphanages. This multiplicity of functions has caused some governments and even the European Union to resist labeling the organization a terrorist group.

Hezbollah also is now far larger and more geographically widespread than ever before, while its global array of members and supporters is intertwined with sophisticated finance/logistics and intelligence networks. Also, thanks to Iran, Hezbollah has far more -- and better trained -- operational cadre than al Qaeda ever had. The Hezbollah cadre also is experienced in skullduggery, having conducted scores of transnational terrorist operations before al Qaeda was even formed. In fact, al Qaeda has borrowed many pages from the Hezbollah operational playbook, and there are persistent rumors that Hezbollah leaders such as Mugniyah even helped teach al Qaeda cadre how to construct large vehicle bombs at al Qaeda's training facilities in Sudan. Also, and this is not trivial, Hezbollah operatives can receive assistance in the form of intelligence, or even materials, from MOIS' worldwide network -- as past attacks demonstrate. (The inviolability of the diplomatic pouch is a wonderful thing when you are planning a terrorist strike.) Iranian state sponsorship provides Hezbollah with a support network that al Qaeda can only dream of.

In Hezbollah, size, professionalism, experience and state-sponsorship are combined to create a dangerous organization. In fact, because of these factors, Hezbollah poses a larger potential threat to the United States than does al Qaeda -- especially an al Qaeda crippled by U.S. actions since 9/11.

Hezbollah Operations

Although Hezbollah operatives are highly skilled in the tradecraft of terrorism, those planning attacks are not invulnerable to detection -- most significantly during the preoperational surveillance stage.

Like the military commands of many countries, Hezbollah uses a contingency, or "off-the-shelf," model of operational planning, meaning that several hypothetical targets are selected and attack plans for each are developed in advance. This gives the Hezbollah leadership several plans to choose from when considering and authorizing an attack -- and it allows the group to hit hard and fast once a decision has been made to strike. Although law enforcement and security officials most likely are aware of some of the preselected targets -- due to countersurveillance operations -- an off-the-shelf operation makes it difficult for authorities to determine which target will actually be hit. Moreover, the potential time lapse between the initial surveillance and any attack could allow any alerts or increased security caused by the surveillance to subside by the time an attack takes place.

Even though Hezbollah tends to use off-the-shelf plans, the need for countersurveillance remains strong. When an order to execute a mission is given, pre-existing plans must be dusted off, meaning the preoperational surveillance must be updated before an actual strike can take place to ensure that no important changes have occurred at the target. Although this second round of surveillance often is less comprehensive than the initial surveillance, these secondary efforts still require cell members to expose themselves -- and thus become vulnerable to detection.

Although it has been many years since Hezbollah conducted an overseas attack, operatives linked to Hezbollah (or the Iranian MOIS/IRGC) have been observed many times conducting surveillance of potential targets inside and outside the United States -- and several operatives have been arrested as a result. In some of these cases, the operatives could have been pinging the system, or even having some fun by messing with the Americans, but Hezbollah's use of off-the-shelf planning is one reason so many detected surveillance efforts have not been followed by an attack.

Judging from Hezbollah's past response to specific events, it seems to take the group four to five weeks to launch an off-the-shelf attack, as was shown in such attacks as the 1992 bombing in Buenos Aires, Argentina, and the 1994 Buenos Aires and London bombings. This time allows planners to touch up the plan, surveil targets again, obtain explosives, construct their devices and bring in an attack team.

Because of this, should the United States strike Iran and Hezbollah be asked to conduct retaliatory strikes overseas, there would be a lag of some four to five weeks before any such attacks would occur. Therefore, countersurveillance efforts should be increased on potential targets during this lag time, especially on targets where Hezbollah or Iranian officers are known to have conducted earlier surveillance.

Although the Iranian MOIS and IRGC components seem to prefer assassinations and small-arms attacks, Hezbollah operatives tend to conduct more spectacular attacks, such as vehicle bombings and hijackings. Hezbollah also has a history of claiming such attacks using pseudonyms, such as Islamic Jihad Organization or Organization for the Oppressed of the Earth, in order to sow confusion and hide the group's hand.

Hezbollah has an expansive worldwide presence, though it has had much greater operational success staging attacks in the developing world -- where weapons and materiel are readily available -- than in more industrialized and secure regions such as Europe. The size difference between the vehicle-borne bombs employed in 1994 in Buenos Aires (where Hezbollah was able to purchase explosives commercially) and the smaller device used in London (where explosives were difficult to obtain) was quite dramatic -- as were the results.

Hezbollah would have strong motives (pleasing its Iranian masters, for one) to conduct an attack inside the United States rather than in the developing world -- even though such an attack might be more limited. In practical terms, however, it might consider how the American response to 9/11 affected al Qaeda and choose not to go down that road. Instead, it could attack Americans abroad, as it has done many times in the past without arousing much U.S. retribution.

Hezbollah, however, has much clearer vulnerabilities than al Qaeda. For example, its training camps and political and social components constitute recognizable infrastructure in Lebanon. While some of that infrastructure is deliberately placed in Lebanese civilian concentrations, a good deal of it, particularly the facilities in the Bekaa Valley, can be attacked without major concern for civilian life. Another consideration for Hezbollah is that the group also maintains close ties to the Syrian regime, and its Syrian handlers do not want to end up in the U.S. crosshairs. Should Hezbollah strike, therefore, it would do so with its characteristically hidden hand.

Ray Takeyh and Nikolas K. Gvosdev :: Pragmatism in the Midst of Iranian Turmoil

Here is a summary of a 2004 article by Ray Takeyh and Nikolas Gvosdev about the challenges of creating a U.S. policy for Iran. Should we support democracy in Iran when the result is not what we would have hoped? Can we work with a government that sponsors terrorism? Should we negotiate with them?

Thesis: Iran poses many challenges for the US, geopolitical, nuclear aspirations, unsavory terrorists’ alliances and strategic significance. A consistent view in Washington is that regime change will only bring about a satisfactory resolution to these challenges. On the other hand, dialogue and negotiations with the Iranian officials may be in the interest of the US. Iranian hardliners use their positions within the judiciary and other bodies to roll back advances made of Iranian reformers and society; however, there may be another group in which the US can work with – this group is the Pragmatic Conservatives.

• Conservative forces in Iran proclaim their loyalty to “Islamic and revolutionary values”. The massive projection of US power along Iran’s periphery has strengthened the position of a cadre of pragmatic conservatives seeking practical solutions to Iran’s increasingly dire situation. This new group seeks to restructure Iran’s domestic priorities and international relations. This presents US with paradox: uphold democratic values, but can be assured Iran will work against US interest – or – overlook democratic deficiencies and work with existing gov’t to reach compromise on issues.

• Iran’s elected institutions are supposed to function in harmony with the religious rulers; however, there often seems to be an embedded contradiction. Reformers that were elected in 1997 had to tread carefully in sweeping reforms or risk overruling by higher clerical bodies. This point is often overlooked by US policymakers. In the 2004 election, hard-liners blocked out reformers by using their influence with the Guardian Council (clerics) to prevent more than 2300 reformists’ candidates from running for office.

• The constant struggle has facilitated the rise of a pragmatic conservative wing. If reformers were compared to Gorbachev – then the pragmatic conservative resembles China’s Deng Xiaoping. They recognize the need for pragmatic policy adjustments to ensure the survival of the regime. Specifically the “China Model” is often referenced for economic purposes. China’s ability to normalize relations with US without undergoing any regime change has much appeal to this group in Iran. Pragmatic conservatives are flexible in domestic and foreign policy matters.

• Pragmatic Conservative view of the following issues:
o Defusing Nuclear Tensions: They see the Nuclear weapons as deterrence to two issues – Sadamm Hussein’s Iraq and US encirclement. Now that the threat from Iraq has gone, there may be room negotiate as defiance of the international community would not serve Iran’s interests.
o Stabilizing Iraq: Iran’s greatest fear is an Iraq that will serve as an agent of US power. Pragmatic conservatives and clerics support the development of a pluralistic decentralized gov’t in Iraq.
o Abandoning Peace Process Spoilers: The Pragmatic conservatives have made it clear that they would treat the war on terror as a tactical matter and would take part in anti-terrorism efforts to a degree.

• Pragmatic conservatives are well aware that the current state of US-Iranian relations inhibits Iran’s economic development, as international investors are not comfortable sending capital to Iran. They are prepared to make a tactical compromise in return for obtaining a non aggression and noninterference guarantee from the US. Iran faces an economic crisis in its future that may precipitate an overthrow of the current regime, if positive steps are not seen.

• The US should be prepared to take positive steps in this regard. Washington holds all the cards as it has military forces stationed all around Iran’s periphery. The process is unlikely to gain momentum until the US and Iranian presidential elections are complete. – This opportunity should not be squandered by the US.

IHT :: Politicus: America's misplaced hopes on Russia

If you are at all uneasy about the direction in which Russia is now heading, this OpEd by John Vinocur that explores Russian obstructionism in helping to curb Iran's nuclear program will only reinforce those concerns....

Monday, September 10, 2007
WASHINGTON: Suppose the Russians, as Iran's monopoly supplier of nuclear wherewithal, decided they could live with a few atomic weapons in the hands of the mullahs.

Suppose the Russians, flush with money and superpower fantasies, believed that weakening and humiliating the United States was well worth the instability that might come with Moscow's refusal to help block Iran's drive toward nuclear arms.

Where's the downside? From Vladimir Putin's point of view, it's win-win.

With Russia's obstructive tactics encouraging Iran to plunge ahead, he may figure the Americans will eventually strike Iranian nuclear installations. The Yanks would harvest opprobrium in much of the world.

Still, if their strike does eradicate the Iranian nuclear program, that's fine, too. Russia's oil and gas prices are sure to shoot up. Russia becomes Iran's key reconstruction contractor, and sets out a rare claim to international righteousness.

What's irrational about the above scenario? Or its counterpart, which is that Russian now calculates the United States in the end will sit on its hands concerning Iran?

Nothing. Multiple versions of them get discussed within the Bush Administration, all stamped, Non Whacko.

It's exemplary of the misery of the American situation.

On one hand, the Administration sticks to the notion - recall, please, George W. Bush's magnanimous first-term reading of Putin's soul in his KGB eyes - that somehow, someday, but in the nick of time, the Russians are going to come around to joining an international effort to halt Iran's nuclear drive.

On the other hand, important areas of the administration are offering a hardened assessment of what Russia ultimately wants.

After a couple of years of talking about how Putin's richer Russia (reasonably) craved respect, a senior administration policymaker, in a private conversation, now asserts the "overwhelming evidence" is a Russia that seeks to weaken the United States. Wherever possible internationally, he says, Moscow will work to stop America from achieving success.

The hitch is that concerning Iran, these two administration notions, expecting good from Russia while regarding it as a gathering, noxious force, are contradictory to the point of incompatibility.

The summer showed just how much.

In June, the Americans said they expected a United Nations Security Council resolution in July that would add a new round of modest sanctions to those already in effect against Iran. It never happened. The Russians, with Chinese assistance, sidetracked the measure.

Reality now says the United Nations is not going to be the place where Iran's nuclear dreams die.

Almost in the same stride, the Russians in July used the threat of a Security Council veto to dismantle an American-backed motion on Kosovo's independence.

The combined effect is not only an American defeat. It's a demonstration that, unlike in the Cold War, there are no clear limits on how far this Russia feels it can push this America.

Forget the grandiloquence of Moscow's planting flags in the Arctic and re-establishing world-wide strategic bomber patrols.

But as the United States flails in Iraq, and faces a financial crisis that may affect command-economies and authoritarian regimes less than democracies, why shouldn't Russia see the Iran issue as a strategic hole for achieving a new global status?

After all, Jacques Chirac, whose vision of a multipolar world consigning America to the role of everyone's opponent gets applause in Moscow, argued in his last months as French president that a few Iranian nukes shouldn't cause much lost sleep for anyone sharing his take on a remade global hierarchy.

Chirac didn't say it, but he could have rationalized that a limited number of atomic weapons at Iran's disposal would be a reasonable price to pay for disabling an American world order that he, like Putin, reviles.

It's a reflection of America's current incapacities that Nicolas Sarkozy, who might have interesting notions of Putin's calculations from Élysée Palace files, two weeks ago detailed the Iran situation in a tougher and more concise way than Washington.

Sarkozy knows that some Westerners who have talked directly to Putin have been told that Russia does not want a nuclear-armed Iran. He also knows the deceit of Russia's official position that it has no evidence indicating Iran's nuclear activities are anything but peaceful.

Draw this conclusion: If Sarkozy has been informed that Putin will act to halt Iran's drive short of a bomb, then he would not be calling the prospect of Iranian atomic bomb capability the world's biggest menace.

There are, on good evidence, officials within the Bush administration frustrated by its own bollixed approach - hoping that the Russians will turn responsible after their "elections" next year while acknowledging Moscow is now in full confrontational mode. Assume they could only leap to praise Sarkozy for saying in a speech a couple of weeks ago what Bush would not:

If sanctions fail, the alternatives are an Iranian bomb or the bombing of Iran. As for Russia, Sarko described its behavior as marked by a "certain brutality."

The sanctions Sarkozy is talking about are hard, new measures outside the United Nations that would probably involve an ad hoc group including the United States, Britain, France and Japan at its core.

This approach specifically means forgetting about the Security Council, and giving up on Russia, barring sudden and unlikely cooperation. The sanctions have to be so penalizing, obviously disadvantaging Western banks and industry, to become truly dissuasive. This requires real resolve.

It also requires the underpinning of a tacit yet palpable threat: if these measures don't work, there's real unpleasantness to come. With a phrase, Sarkozy marked out the Iranian choice with a sharper edge than the Americans have.

That's a significant advance.

But unless Bush first gets publicly tougher on Russia as Iran's protector and international obstructionist, the mullahs may take America's insistence on skirting this reality as the surest sign they can get that they're home free.

Afshin Molavi :: “Buying Time in Tehran: Iran and the China Model”

Here is a summary of Afshin Molavi's 2004 article, “Buying Time in Tehran: Iran and the China Model.”

Thesis: The Iranian government’s attempt to address economic problems, especially among the country’s young people, through a China model of economic growth and limited political freedom, may work on a modest level. Fundamentally, however, the country faces serious economic problems, due to chaotic economic management and crony capitalism, which the current oil revenue windfall conceals to some extent. Iran will not collapse, but will not have significant economic growth either.

• Iran has been in economic decline since the ’79 revolution, e.g., per capita income is 1/3 of pre-revolution. period; inflation; underemployment;
• Hard-liners thwarted President Khatami’s efforts at political and economic reform; young people are frustrated, desire political and economic change, but don’t know how to achieve them;
• Conservatives proposed “China” economic model. Growth, jobs, limited freedoms in return for continued control of politics;
• Prospects for success: poor, if Tehran wants to copy China’s growth; better if goals are more modest, i.e., limited growth to forestall political unrest; Note: too much growth might embolden the middle class to challenge the conservative leaders;
• Iranians have become deeply apathetic, due to economic woes and lack of political reform; voter turnout in Feb. 2004 elections was lowest since revolution;
• Economic reform won’t be easy; factionalized politics have paralyzed economic policy making;
• Conservatives see China model mainly as way to prevent political unrest; pragmatists want more economic reform and general openness; conservatives seem to be in control for the time being;

• Multiple years of high oil prices have allowed government to delay much-needed reforms without disrupting its patronage network;
• Note: oil windfall has not boosted employment, so pragmatists may eventually regain power;
• Iran has tried China model before (under Rafsanjani); resulted, however, in strengthening entrenched economic elite, and injecting state entities into economy, e.g., several ministries run their own businesses;
• Corruption also a problem; “oligarchic and kleptocratic government;”

• Iran also hampered by U.S. sanctions, which are likely to remain in place indefinitely;
• Even apart from sanctions, economic prospects aren’t good;
• Need large amount of foreign investment, which is unlikely due to corruption, bureaucratic in-fighting, ideological opposition in Iranian government;
• Hard-line Iranian officials view foreign investors as “exploiters;” insularity also reflected within country, as conservatives like to restrict economic and political power to “insiders” i.e., like-minded people with social or family links to officials;
• In sum, China model may bring some modest improvements, but Iran will continue to operate far below its potential; long-term political uncertainty, however, because of large young segment of population;

STRATFOR: Iran, the United States and Potential Iraq Deal-Spoilers

Are we reaching multiple pivot points in the Middle East? As one strategically-minded friend of mine reported, we certainly are, and he believes they're all interdependent: "Lebanon/Hariri; Israel-Syria; Iran-nukes; Iraq surge – that together amount to a showdown broadly between a US-EU-Israel-Sunni Arab block on one side and Iran-Syria-affiliated proxes Hezbollah and Hamas on the other. Things may be about to get much better, or much worse." Normally, I wouldn't post an entire article, but this one about Iranian pivot point from Stratfor is extremely insightful and suggests a host of "sub-pivots" at work. Reva Bhalla is the author....

After 27 years of frozen relations, the United States and Iran held their first high-level direct talks in Baghdad on May 28 to negotiate a plan on how to stabilize Iraq. U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker and his Iranian counterpart, Hassan Kazemi-Qomi, traded accusations about who was the bigger destabilizing force in Iraq. But by the end of the four-hour meeting, both described the negotiations as a positive first step in bringing the two sides together to stabilize Iraq. Kazemi-Qomi even said there probably would be a follow-up meeting within a month if he gets the OK from Tehran.

Iran and the United States evidently have come a long way since the spring of 2003, when Washington double-crossed Tehran on the two countries' original understanding that a pro-Iranian, Shiite-dominated Iraq would be allowed to emerge in exchange for Iran's help in effecting regime change in Baghdad. When the United States removed two hostile Sunni regimes from Iran's border -- the Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein in Iraq -- the Iranians knew they had to check the United States on the regional chessboard so Washington understood any U.S. exit strategy from Iraq would have to come through Tehran. Only then, Tehran reasoned, could Iran use Iraq as a launchpad to extend Iranian influence in the Arab world.

Feeling a deep sense of betrayal, the Iranian government carried out a variety of deadly maneuvers that ultimately convinced Washington that neither the Iranians nor the Americans were going to succeed in gluing Iraq back together on their own. The negotiations are still marred by mutual distrust, but after four years of explosive negotiating tactics, Iran and the United States have reached a point at which both sides have acknowledged they cannot afford to avoid each other if they want to avoid their worst-case scenarios in Iraq.

As the negotiations grow in intensity, so does the noise. The lead-up to the May 28 talks was punctuated by a series of interesting jabs as each side sought leverage against the other. While the United States sent nine warships with 17,000 troops into the Persian Gulf (which the U.S. military deliberately referred to as the Arabian Gulf in the official press release on the naval exercises) and stepped up threats of broadening sanctions against Tehran due to the latter's nuclear activities, Iran continued broadcasting its atomic advances and announced it had uncovered Western-run spy rings inside the Islamic republic. The United States is still holding onto five Iranian officials arrested in the northern Iraqi city of Arbil in January as bargaining chips in talks with Iran. Iran has responded with a series of arrests of Iranian-Americans affiliated with think tanks on allegations they are dissidents working to topple the clerical regime. These belligerent tactics are all part of the game, and will flare up even further as the negotiations grow more serious.

The Meat of the Matter

It now becomes all the more critical to cut to the meat of these talks: the negotiating terms put forth by Washington and Tehran over how each plans to fix Iraq.

Iran handed over a proposal to Crocker during a brief encounter at the May 5-6 Sharm el-Sheikh summit in Egypt, but also chose to unofficially publicize its terms for Iraq through the Saudi-owned, British-based daily Al Hayat. The Iranian Foreign Ministry likely chose Al Hayat, a major Arab news outlet, to make a back-channel broadcast of what concessions it is prepared to make to allay Sunni concerns in the region.

In sum, this Iranian proposal called for a non-rushed withdrawal and relocation of U.S. troops to bases inside Iraq, a rejection of all attempts to partition Iraq, a commitment by the Sunni bloc to root out the jihadists and acknowledgement by Washington that the Iranian nuclear file cannot be uncoupled from the Iraq negotiations. In return, Iran would rein in the armed Shiite militias, revise the de-Baathification law and Iraqi Constitution to double Sunni political representation, create a policy to allow for the fair distribution of oil revenues (particularly to the Sunnis) and use its regional influence to quell crises in areas such as Lebanon, Syria and the Palestinian territories.

The terms put forth by the Iranians are so close to the U.S. position on Iraq that, with little exception, they could have been printed on State Department stationary and no one would have noticed the difference. If these are the terms Washington and Tehran are in fact discussing, then we are witnessing an extraordinary turn in the Iraq war in which the U.S. and Iranian blueprints for Iraq are finally aligning. It does not surprise us, then, that Crocker said after his meeting in Baghdad that the Iranian position "was very close to our own" at the level of policy and principle.

The Spoilers

The prospect of Washington and Tehran warming up to each other, and of the United States potentially regaining its military bandwidth in the not-too-distant future, is enough to put a number of serious actors into a frenzy. With the exception of the jihadists, most of the actors in question see an Iranian-U.S. accommodation over Iraq as inevitable, and have little choice but to strive to shape what would otherwise be an imposed reality in the coming months -- leaving substantial room for error in these negotiations. The Iraqi Sunnis and Arab states, in particular, will not necessarily sabotage the talks, but they will be working to secure Sunni interests and contain the extent to which Iran emerges as the primary beneficiary of any deal it works out with the United States over Iraq.

Jihadists

Within Iraq, the transnational jihadists have the most immediate concerns. A political settlement in Baghdad inevitably would involve a concerted effort by Iraq's Shia and mainstream Sunnis to uproot the jihadists and deprive them of the chaotic security conditions needed for their operations. The apex leadership of al Qaeda hiding out along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border is also betting on continued bedlam in Iraq to keep the transnational jihadist movement alive, and will not be happy to see U.S. forces beefed up in the South Asia theater once a deal is sealed in Iraq. Violence aimed at heightening sectarian tensions to derail the negotiations -- particularly attacks aimed at inflaming the Shia -- will escalate substantially over the next few weeks and months in Iraq. High-value political targets also likely will be targeted for assassination in an effort to disrupt the leadership structure of the respective factions.

Iraqi Shia

The Iranians face a daunting task in whipping Iraq's Shiite bloc into shape to follow through with Tehran's commitment to quell sectarian attacks and consolidate Shiite political power in Iraq for the first time in the country's history. Factionalism is already hardwired into the structure of the Iraqi Shiite community, whose loyalties are spread among the three largest political groups -- the (newly named) Iraqi Islamic Supreme Council, Hizb al-Dawah and the al-Sadrite bloc, as well as a number of smaller Shiite groups in southern Iraq, such as the Fadhila party. The intra-Shiite rivalries within and between these groups are enough to give anyone a headache, but Iran is well aware that violence and a good deal of oil money will be needed to bring the Iraqi Shia in line and make these negotiations work. Though the main political groups are more comfortable with the idea of working with Iran, Tehran has to play its cards carefully to ensure it does not trigger nationalist Arab sentiment among the Shiite actors, who already are deeply suspicious of Iran's intentions and have the arms and access to Iraq's southern oil fields to use as tools for stirring up trouble.

Iraqi Sunnis

Though not nearly as fractured as the Iraqi Shia, the Sunni landscape in Iraq has plenty of cracks of its own to make these negotiations troublesome. The Sunni factions in play include:

-The existing political blocs, divided between the Islamist Iraqi Accord Front and the secular-leaning Iraqi National Dialogue Front;

-The tribal groups, such as Anbar Salvation Council, that are actively fighting transnational jihadists to get a seat at the negotiating table;

-The Sunni religious establishment, led by the hard-line Association of Muslim Scholars of Iraq that has close links with the insurgent groups and has become increasingly anti-Iranian in recent weeks;

-The Sunni nationalist insurgents, who are looking for an acceptable opening into the political process, but remain distrustful of Shiite intentions.

-The Iraqi Sunnis know they have to drive a hard bargain in these talks to ensure that Iraq's Sunnis are well-integrated in the state political and security apparatus to counter the Shiite majority. And they will continue to rely on explosives during the talks to make sure their demands are heard. Competing factions within the Sunni bloc and resistance from their former jihadist allies will only further complicate these negotiations, but unlike the jihadists, these Sunni groups are not opposed in principle to a deal that includes the Iranians -- they actually want negotiations.

Iraqi Kurds

By the looks of the Iranian proposal, the Kurds have plenty to worry about. Expanding Sunni political representation and changing the constitution to allow for a more "fair" distribution of oil resources leaves the Kurdish bloc in an all-too-familiar scenario in which Kurdish interests will be sacrificed by the United States to protect the interests of Iraq's neighbors.

Thus far, the Kurds have used the distraction of Sunni-Shiite bloodletting farther south to consolidate power between the two main rival Kurdish blocs (an extremely rare occurrence) and push forward with Kurdish autonomous demands to open Iraq's northern oil fields to foreign business. Once Iraq's Shiite and Sunni blocs reach some level of a political understanding in Baghdad, their attention will soon turn to their common adversary in the north, leaving the Kurds to face familiar moves by the Iraqi government to suppress Kurdish autonomy. The Kurds will need to drive a hard bargain by pushing through a Kirkuk referendum by year's end and resisting radical changes to the constitution and pending hydrocarbons legislation that threaten to put Iraq's undeveloped fields in the north under state control. The biggest threats the Kurds could make to a U.S.-Iranian deal over Iraq would involve withdrawing Kurdish support for U.S. forces or threatening to pull out of the government. But in the end, a compromise looks inevitable simply because the Kurds have nowhere else to turn.

Ultraconservatives in Washington and Tehran

There are ultraconservative factions in both Tehran and Washington that are not nearly as enthused about a U.S.-Iran rapprochement, and could use their influence to complicate the negotiations. Rumor has it that in Iran there are major disagreements brewing between the president and other senior Iranian officials, particularly on foreign policy matters. There are also growing indications that the apex of the clerical establishment is making moves to sideline Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and weaken the influence of his ultraconservative faction as a preventative measure to ensure progress in these talks. Though Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has thus far managed the deep divisions within the Iranian establishment between the ultraconservative and pragmatic conservative factions, his ability to contain these divisions is held hostage by his failing health.

Meanwhile, hard-line elements in Washington are actively spreading information in an allegedly covert campaign signed off on by U.S. President George W. Bush to topple the clerical regime. These actors are more interested in effecting a policy of regime change rather than in a rapprochement with Iran, and they view the negotiations as little more than a smoke screen for a covert campaign to rid the Islamic republic of its ruling ayatollahs. These rumors threaten to fuel even more distrust between the two sides while the negotiations are in full swing, especially as Iran's greatest fear is that it will end up being backstabbed all over again once Washington recovers from Iraq and has enough bandwidth to entertain military options.

Sunni Regional Powers

Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Arab states are extraordinarily nervous about the idea of having the United States and Iran conduct exclusive meetings over a matter that directly concerns their national security interests. As the leader of the Sunni Arabs, the Saudis believe they have every right to be part of the formal negotiating process, but they also see the inevitability of the United States and Iran working toward an Iraq settlement. With the most at stake, the Saudi government normally would be screeching in protest during these U.S.-Iranian bilateral meetings, but instead it is keeping quiet. For now, the Saudis have to rely on the United States to ensure their demands for Sunni representation and Iranian containment are heard.

Meanwhile, the Iranians evidently are working to allay Sunni Arab fears by publicizing Tehran's Iraq proposal (with considerable concessions to Iraq's Sunnis) in the mainstream Arab press and stepping up diplomatic engagements with Iran's Sunni neighbors in the Gulf. But the more the Iranians speak of arming and training the Iraqi army, the more the Saudis have to worry about. The House of Saud does not want to be looking at a scenario down the road in which U.S. troops have withdrawn from Iraq while Iran uses its militant proxies there to create an excuse to intervene militarily, putting Iranian troops within sight of Saudi Arabia's oil- and Shiite-rich Eastern province. The Saudis are also not looking forward to the day when war-hardened Saudi jihadist veterans in Iraq return home to wage attacks in the kingdom. Though the Saudis might see an Iran-U.S. deal as inevitable, they will keep their ties to the full spectrum of Sunni militants to use as their main deal-breaker should an Iraq settlement fail to address their interests.

Syria

Syrian President Bashar al Assad also probably is lying awake at night over these U.S.-Iran talks. The Alawite-Baathist regime in Syria loved the idea of its allies in Tehran expanding Shiite influence while the United States remained far too militarily occupied in Iraq to bother with Syria. The insurgency in Iraq also provided Syria with a vital pressure release valve for Sunni militants in the country. Like Riyadh, the regime in Damascus does not want to see jihadists returning home from Iraq to carry out attacks on native soil.

Despite these concerns, the Syrians are hoping their alliance with Tehran will pay off and result in serious recognition and security assurances from the United States. For this to happen, Syria has to prove it is an integral piece of this Iraq deal by showing it possesses the ability to clamp down on insurgent traffic (by funneling jihadists into Lebanon for now). While Syria offers limited cooperation over Iraq to show its powers, the al Assad regime will become further emboldened to secure its interests in Lebanon, where Syria's priorities are rooted.

Russia

But the player with perhaps the most to lose is not even located in the Middle East. That player is Russia. At first glance, Russia is an odd party to even be involved in the Iraqi imbroglio. It has no troops in country and, no matter what happens to Iraq in the long run, Baghdad has no impact on anything Russian. Certainly Moscow was friendly with the previous government, but not to the degree that Saddam Hussein's fall appreciably impacted Russian political or economic interests.

Russia does, however, have two horses in this race.

The first relates to the Iranian nuclear program, which lists the Russian-built Bushehr power plant as its crown jewel. Despite Iranian protestations to the contrary, Tehran's nuclear program is largely a result of Russian technology sharing. And, should the Russians walk away, the Iranian program will have suffered a monumental setback. Similarly, so long as Russia has not finished the reactor at Bushehr, the West cannot ignore Moscow's ability to function as an interlocutor in Tehran. So long as the facility is "under construction," Russia has leverage over both parties. As soon as Russia's technicians finish, however, that leverage evaporates.

Second, and far more important: So long as the bulk of the United States' and Iran's political and military attention is absorbed in Iraq, neither has any bandwidth to deal with other issues. Iran has deep and lasting interests in Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan -- states of critical interest to Moscow -- yet Iran's preoccupation with Iraq has prevented Tehran from capitalizing on recent opportunities. Similarly, the United States has faced no foe more challenging than the Soviet Union and its Russian successor. In that vein, there is no country more desirous of challenging Russia's ongoing efforts to rewire European security arrangements in its own favor than the United States. But that requires a Washington not consumed by the black hole Iraq has become.

A Rough Road Ahead
It took four years of heavy-handed negotiating tactics to bring U.S.-Iranian dealings over Iraq out of the back channels and into the public view.

That was half the battle.

The aligning of the U.S. and Iranian proposals for Iraq marks a significant inflection point in the war, but we still question whether the three big players negotiating this deal -- Washington, Tehran and Riyadh -- can trust each other enough and carry enough sway among Iraq's state actors to get them to cooperate and actually produce results on the ground. Once you throw the spoilers into this equation, along with a centuries-old Arab-Persian rivalry centered on containing the very rise that Iran is anticipating this deal will yield, the prospect of a U.S.-Iranian accommodation over Iraq coming to fruition does not look so good. Our hopes are not completely dashed, but we do see a bumpy road ahead.

Preventive Attacks against Nuclear Programs and the "Success" at Osiraq

Dan Reiter's article, "Preventive Attacks against Nuclear Programs and the "Success" at Osiraq," is a timely one to consider as we witness an unprecedented force presence in the Persian Gulf, off the Iranian coast. Would an attack on the Iranian nuclear program be effective? Reiter doesn't think so, and he presents a rather compelling argument to justify that opinion. Here's a summary-excerpt:

Advocates of the preventive use of force against emerging nuclear, biological, or chemical programs often look to the allegedly successful 1981 Israeli airstrike against Iraqi nuclear facilities at Osiraq. According to conventional wisdom, this attack may have prevented Iraq from going nuclear before Operation Desert Storm in 1991.

The article casts doubt on the conclusion that the attack was successful, for three reasons:

1) the reactor itself was not well equipped to generate plutonium for a nuclear weapon;

2) likely illegal plutonium production would have caused a cutoff in the supply of nuclear fuel and an end to weapons activities; and

3) the attack may have actually increased Saddam's commitment to acquiring weapons.

Did the 1981 attack substantially delayed Iraqi acquisition of nuclear weapons?

Many consider the 1981 Israeli air strike on the Osirak nuclear reactor a good preventive action, on grounds that it set back Iraq's attempts to develop nuclear weapons. It is not clear, however, that by 1981 Iraq had come close to developing plutonium reprocessing or uranium enrichment facilities, which, in contrast to a simple reactor, are the critical facilities for a weapons program. It is clear, though, that within a decade Iraq did develop an enrichment capability. Thus, the Israeli attack on the reactor did not destroy the crucial ingredients in a weapons effort, nor did it interfere with subsequent Iraqi efforts in the 1980s. It is hard to determine in fact whether the strike against Osirak retarded Iraq's nuclear weapons program or spurred it.

Could international inspections have prevented Iraq from diverting plutonium from the reactor? France seemed committed to preventing Iraq from acquiring nuclear weapons. There is some evidence that the French actually knew of and may have even facilitated the 1981 Israeli attack.

Inspection would likely have prevented substantial Iraqi diversion of plutonium from Osiraq to build a bomb. After the attack some argued that international inspections would likely have failed. The IAEA could have been blocked from inspecting non-reactor facilities with the potential to contribute to weaponization. Another critique was that plutonium could be produced between inspections.

Would Iraq have been closer to acquiring a nuclear weapon in 1991 had Israel not attacked? There is reason to believe that the attack may have actually increased Saddam’s commitment to acquiring nuclear weapons, perhaps because it could have raised Saddam’s estimation of the importance of acquiring nuclear weapons.

Absent the attack, would Iraq have had the resources to build the secret reactor fast enough to produce sufficient plutonium for a bomb by 1991? The answer is probably not. Project 182 probably began only in reaction to the destruction of Osiraq—meaning that thad the attack not occurred, it would likely have taken Iraq some years to commit to the secret reactor, after plutonium production at Osiraq had been thwarted by inspectors.

Conclusions: Without the Osiraq attack, Iraq would have had the physical ability to produce small amounts of fissile material (plutonium) by the early 1980s, through international inspectors would likely have detected this activity and shut down the reactor by stopping the fuel supply. With the Osiraq attack, Iraq would have had the physical ability to produce larger amounts of fissile material (enriched uranium) by the early 1990s, without any impediment from international inspectors. Even without the attack, Iraq would likely not have had a nuclear weapon by 1991 because of technical barriers separate from the production of fissile material.

The 1981 Israeli attack on the Iraqi reactor on Osiraq did not substantially slow the Iraqi acquisition of nuclear weapons. The reactor itself and the fuel it would have consumed were not well suited from plutonium production. The presence of international inspectors, foreign technicians, and constant camera surveillance would have at least substantially slowed down Iraqi plutonium production, and probably prevented it altogether.

What are the lessons of Osiraq for possible future attacks against nuclear facilities? If the 1981 raid is the most successful of such preventive, anti-nuclear attacks, even this raid had dubious success in comparison to much less successful attacks. A cautionary tale.

These conclusions have implications for the Bush Doctrine, as the lack of success in 1981 casts doubt on the possible success of future attacks against nuclear programs in North Korea and Iran.

Future airstikes may incur much higher costs for the U.S. than the 1981 attack for the Israelis. Depending on the target, airstrikes would lead to increased terrorism and more attacks—against South Korea, Israel, Lebanon, in Iraq.

The Nuclear Sphinx of Tehran: An Excerpt

Yossi Melman (a well-known Israeli intelligence expert) and Meir Javedanfar (an Iranian-born insider) are the authors of the new book, The Nuclear Sphinx: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the State of Iran . Melman and Javedanfar remove at least part of the veil that has covered Mahmoud Ahmadinejad--but not all of it. Little is revealed, for instance, about the Iranian president's involvement in the Iranian hostage crisis. Nonetheless, Melman and Javedanfer provide some well-reasoned predictions and recommendations for the way ahead in dealing with Tehran's nuclear ambitions....
Excellent.

In analyzing the issues surrounding Iran's nuclear program and its president, the following point about Iran's politics, economy and nuclear policies should not be ignored:

-The country has been in a deep economic crisis for two decades and it is not going to end soon.

-Iran's oil industry, the main source of its livlihood, is facing severe difficulties. Iran's oil companies are calling for tens of billions of dollars in investments to replace old, crumbling equipment. Estimates projects that if Iran does not invest soon in its oil industry, its oil exports may disappear within a decade.

-Despite its one-party system and the ayatollahs' tight grip on the reins of power, Iran has a lively political system. Dissenting voices find a way to express themselves despite the authoritarian nature of the regime. Ahmadinejad's policies are constantly being challenged domestically.

-Sanctions, especially tough economic sanctions such as an oil embargo, may work. However unlikely they are, they would put Iran's leadership under tremendous pressure. But sanctions can backfire, as the events of the 1950s showed.

-Iran's nuclear facilities are spread in dozens of hidden sites, some of which are located in residential areas or inside hardened bunkers. A military strike in these areas might increase hatred of the West and rally the Iranian people.

-Iran will retaliate if it is attacked and it has the ability to cause extensive damage to countries in the region and to U.S forces stationed in neighboring countries, and to launch terrorist attacks against Israeli, Jewish, U.S., and European targets.

-Regime change is a long process that, based on the Iraqi precedent, seems beyond the ability of an American administration for some time to come.

-Even if Iran possesses nuclear weapons, it may not necessarily use them. Furthermore, the liklihood that Iran would hand over nuclear weapons to terrorists is even slimmer. On the surface, Iran's leaders show no mercy and have no inhibitions, but they have occasionally proved to be responsible and even restrained.

-Even if Iran has nuclear weapons, sanctions and regime change can still take place.