JOHN FENZEL

The Bilderberg Group, Power Elites, Closed-Door Deals and Unspoken Agendas...

The Bilderberg Group, the unofficial annual invitation-only conference of around 130 persons of influence in the fields of business, media and politics, is now meeting through June 8 at the Westfields Marriott Hotel in Chantilly, Virginia.  If you ever wondered what was discussed at a conference of power-elites, to include actively serving senior public officials, all that is really needed is to look at the list of the attendees; the better question to ask, however, might be: "what is discussed outside the conference, behind closed doors?"

Here is the list of attendees for this year's Bilderberg Group:

DEU "Ackermann, Josef" "Chairman of the Management Board and the Group Executive Committee, Deutsche Bank AG"
CAN "Adams, John" Associate Deputy Minister of National Defence and Chief of the Communications Security Establishment Canada
USA "Ajami, Fouad" "Director, Middle East Studies Program, The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University"
USA "Alexander, Keith B." "Director, National Security Agency"
INT "Almunia, Joaquín " "Commissioner, European Commission"
GRC "Alogoskoufis, George" Minister of Economy and Finance
USA "Altman, Roger C." "Chairman, Evercore Partners Inc."
TUR "Babacan, Ali " Minister of Foreign Affairs
NLD "Balkenende, Jan Peter" Prime Minister
PRT "Balsemão, Francisco Pinto" "Chairman and CEO, IMPRESA, S.G.P.S.; Former Prime Minister"
FRA "Baverez, Nicolas" "Partner, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP"
ITA "Bernabè, Franco" "CEO, Telecom Italia Spa"
USA "Bernanke, Ben S." "Chairman, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System"
SWE "Bildt, Carl" Minister of Foreign Affairs
FIN "Blåfield, Antti " "Senior Editorial Writer, Helsingin Sanomat"
DNK "Bosse, Stine" "CEO, TrygVesta"
CAN "Brodie, Ian " "Chief of Staff, Prime Minister’s Office"
AUT "Bronner, Oscar" "Publisher and Editor, Der Standard"
FRA "Castries, Henri de " "Chairman of the Management Board and CEO, AXA"
ESP "Cebrián, Juan Luis" "CEO, PRISA"
CAN "Clark, Edmund" "President and CEO, TD Bank Financial Group"
GBR "Clarke, Kenneth" Member of Parliament
NOR "Clemet, Kristin" "Managing Director, Civita"
USA "Collins, Timothy C." "Senior Managing Director and CEO, Ripplewood Holdings, LLC"
FRA "Collomb, Bertrand" "Honorary Chairman, Lafarge"
PRT "Costa, António" Mayor of Lisbon
USA "Crocker, Chester A." James R. Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies
USA "Daschle, Thomas A." Former US Senator and Senate Majority Leader
CAN "Desmarais, Jr., Paul " "Chairman and co-CEO, Power Corporation of Canada"
GRC "Diamantopoulou, Anna" Member of Parliament
USA "Donilon, Thomas E." "Partner, O’Melveny & Myers"
ITA "Draghi, Mario" "Governor, Banca d’Italia"
AUT "Ederer, Brigitte" "CEO, Siemens AG Österreich"
CAN "Edwards, N. Murray " "Vice Chairman, Candian Natural Resources Limited"

DNK "Eldrup, Anders " "President, DONG A/S"
ITA "Elkann, John" "Vice Chairman, Fiat S.p.A."
USA "Farah, Martha J." "Director, Center for Cognitive Neuroscience; Walter H. Annenberg Professor in the Natural Sciences, University of Pennsylvania"
USA "Feldstein, Martin S." "President and CEO, National Bureau of Economic Research"
DEU "Fischer, Joschka" Former Minister of Foreign Affairs
USA "Ford, Jr., Harold E." "Vice Chairman, Merill Lynch & Co., Inc."
CHE "Forstmoser, Peter" "Professor for Civil, Corporation and Capital Markets Law, University of Zürich"
IRL "Gallagher, Paul " Attorney General
USA "Geithner, Timothy F. " "President and CEO, Federal Reserve Bank of New York"
USA "Gigot, Paul " "Editorial Page Editor, The Wall Street Journal"
IRL "Gleeson, Dermot " "Chairman, AIB Group"
NLD "Goddijn, Harold" "CEO, TomTom"
TUR "Gögüs, Zeynep " "Journalist; Founder, EurActiv.com.tr"
USA "Graham, Donald E." "Chairman and CEO, The Washington Post Company"
NLD "Halberstadt, Victor" "Professor of Economics, Leiden University; Former Honorary Secretary General of Bilderberg Meetings"
USA "Holbrooke, Richard C. " "Vice Chairman, Perseus, LLC"
FIN "Honkapohja, Seppo" "Member of the Board, Bank of Finland"
INT "Hoop Scheffer, Jaap G. de" "Secretary General, NATO"
USA "Hubbard, Allan B." "Chairman, E & A Industries, Inc."
BEL "Huyghebaert, Jan" "Chairman of the Board of Directors, KBC Group"
DEU "Ischinger, Wolfgang" Former Ambassador to the UK and US
USA "Jacobs, Kenneth" "Deputy Chairman, Head of Lazard U.S., Lazard Frères & Co. LLC"
USA "Johnson, James A." "Vice Chairman, Perseus, LLC" (Obama’s man tasked with selecting his running mate)
SWE "Johnstone, Tom " "President and CEO, AB SKF"
USA "Jordan, Jr., Vernon E." "Senior Managing Director, Lazard Frères & Co. LLC"
FRA "Jouyet, Jean-Pierre " Minister of European Affairs
GBR "Kerr, John " "Member, House of Lords; Deputy Chairman, Royal Dutch Shell plc."
USA "Kissinger, Henry A." "Chairman, Kissinger Associates, Inc."
DEU "Klaeden, Eckart von" "Foreign Policy Spokesman, CDU/CSU"
USA "Kleinfeld, Klaus" "President and COO, Alcoa"
TUR "Koç, Mustafa " "Chairman, Koç Holding A.S."
FRA "Kodmani, Bassma" "Director, Arab Reform Initiative"
USA "Kravis, Henry R." "Founding Partner, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co."
USA "Kravis, Marie-Josée" "Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute, Inc."
INT "Kroes, Neelie " "Commissioner, European Commission"
POL "Kwasniewski, Aleksander " Former President
AUT "Leitner, Wolfgang" "CEO, Andritz AG"
ESP "León Gross, Bernardino" "Secretary General, Office of the Prime Minister"
INT "Mandelson, Peter" "Commissioner, European Commission"
FRA "Margerie, Christophe de" "CEO, Total"
CAN "Martin, Roger" "Dean, Joseph L. Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto"
HUN "Martonyi, János" "Professor of International Trade Law; Partner, Baker & McKenzie; Former Minister of Foreign Affairs"
USA "Mathews, Jessica T. " "President, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace"

INT "McCreevy, Charlie " "Commissioner, European Commission"
USA "McDonough, William J." "Vice Chairman and Special Advisor to the Chairman, Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc."
CAN "McKenna, Frank" "Deputy Chair, TD Bank Financial Group"
GBR "McKillop, Tom " "Chairman, The Royal Bank of Scotland Group"
FRA "Montbrial, Thierry de" "President, French Institute for International Relations"
ITA "Monti, Mario" "President, Universita Commerciale Luigi Bocconi"
USA "Mundie, Craig J. " "Chief Research and Strategy Officer, Microsoft Corporation"
NOR "Myklebust, Egil" "Former Chairman of the Board of Directors SAS, Norsk Hydro ASA"
DEU "Nass, Matthias" "Deputy Editor, Die Zeit"
NLD "Netherlands, H.M. the Queen of the"
FRA "Ockrent, Christine" "CEO, French television and radio world service"
FIN "Ollila, Jorma" "Chairman, Royal Dutch Shell plc"
SWE "Olofsson, Maud " Minister of Enterprise and Energy; Deputy Prime Minister
NLD "Orange, H.R.H. the Prince of"
GBR "Osborne, George" Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer
TUR "Öztrak, Faik" Member of Parliament
ITA "Padoa-Schioppa, Tommaso " Former Minister of Finance; President of Notre Europe
GRC "Papahelas, Alexis" "Journalist, Kathimerini"
GRC "Papalexopoulos, Dimitris" "CEO, Titan Cement Co. S.A."
USA "Paulson, Jr., Henry M." Secretary of the Treasury
USA "Pearl, Frank H." "Chairman and CEO, Perseus, LLC"
USA "Perle, Richard N." "Resident Fellow, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research"
FRA "Pérol, François" Deputy General Secretary in charge of Economic Affairs
DEU "Perthes, Volker" "Director, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik"
BEL "Philippe, H.R.H. Prince"
CAN "Prichard, J. Robert S." "President and CEO, Torstar Corporation"
CAN "Reisman, Heather M." "Chair and CEO, Indigo Books & Music Inc."
USA "Rice, Condoleezza" Secretary of State
PRT "Rio, Rui " Mayor of Porto
USA "Rockefeller, David " "Former Chairman, Chase Manhattan Bank"
ESP "Rodriguez Inciarte, Matias" "Executive Vice Chairman, Grupo Santander"
USA "Rose, Charlie" "Producer, Rose Communications"
DNK "Rose, Flemming" "Editor, Jyllands Posten"
USA "Ross, Dennis B." "Counselor and Ziegler Distinguished Fellow, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy"
USA "Rubin, Barnett R." "Director of Studies and Senior Fellow, Center for International Cooperation, New York University"
TUR "Sahenk, Ferit " "Chairman, Dogus Holding A.S."
USA "Sanford, Mark" Governor of South Carolina
USA "Schmidt, Eric" "Chairman of the Executive Committee and CEO, Google"
AUT "Scholten, Rudolf " "Member of the Board of Executive Directors, Oesterreichische Kontrollbank AG"
DNK "Schur, Fritz H. " Fritz Schur Gruppen
CZE "Schwarzenberg, Karel " Minister of Foreign Affairs
USA "Sebelius, Kathleen" Governor of Kansas
USA "Shultz, George P." "Thomas W. and Susan B. Ford Distinguished Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University"

ESP "Spain, H.M. the Queen of"
CHE "Spillmann, Markus" "Editor-in-Chief and Head Managing Board, Neue Zürcher Zeitung AG"
USA "Summers, Lawrence H." "Charles W. Eliot Professor, Harvard University"
GBR "Taylor, J. Martin" "Chairman, Syngenta International AG"
USA "Thiel, Peter A." "President, Clarium Capital Management, LLC"
NLD "Timmermans, Frans " Minister of European Affairs
RUS "Trenin, Dmitri V." "Deputy Director and Senior Associate, Carnegie Moscow Center"
INT "Trichet, Jean-Claude" "President, European Central Bank"
USA "Vakil, Sanam" "Assistant Professor of Middle East Studies, The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University"
FRA "Valls, Manuel " Member of Parliament
GRC "Varvitsiotis, Thomas" "Co-Founder and President, V + O Communication"
CHE "Vasella, Daniel L." "Chairman and CEO, Novartis AG"
FIN "Väyrynen, Raimo" "Director, The Finnish Institute of International Affairs"
FRA "Védrine, Hubert" Hubert Védrine Conseil
NOR "Vollebaek, Knut" "High Commissioner on National Minorities, OSCE"
SWE "Wallenberg, Jacob" "Chairman, Investor AB"
USA "Weber, J. Vin" "CEO, Clark & Weinstock"
USA "Wolfensohn, James D. " "Chairman, Wolfensohn & Company, LLC"
USA "Wolfowitz, Paul " "Visiting Scholar, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research"
INT "Zoellick, Robert B. " "President, The World Bank Group"

Rapporteurs
GBR "Bredow, Vendeline von" "Business Correspondent, The Economist"
GBR "Wooldridge, Adrian D." "Foreign Correspondent, The Economist"

AUT Austria HUN Hungary
BEL Belgium INT International
CHE Switzerland IRL Ireland
CAN Canada ITA Italy
CZE Czech Republic NOR Norway
DEU Germany NLD Netherlands
DNK Denmark PRT Portugal
ESP Spain POL Poland
FRA France RUS Russia
FIN Finland SWE Sweden
GBR Great Britain TUR Turkey
GRC Greece USA United States of America

Stewart Patrick: Weak States and Global Threats: Facts or Fiction?

In his Washington Quarterly article, Weak States and Global Threats: Fact or Fiction? Stewart Patrick contends that more detailed analysis needs to be conducted to establish the linkage between the assertion that ‘weak and failing states’ pose a threat to US national security.  He discusses some frameworks to accomplish this analysis, as well as some general conclusions and options for US policy. Here is a summary of his interesting article... The common claim is that new US security threats are from predominantly poorly governed countries.   All agencies within the Government are actively scrambling to react to this changing threat.   Other nations and international organizations have also embraced this changing threat such as the UK, UN, and the World Bank. Suprisingly, there is little empirical data to support this assertion; most is based on anecdotal evidence. In defining weak and failing states, the problem is the lack of a widely accepted set of criteria in which to assess countries.  Estimates vary, but by the U.S. estimate, there are 50-60 such countries; by UK there are 46, and the World Bank assesses the number to be around 30.  Stewart claims 4 major areas should be assessed: physical security, political institutions, economic management and social welfare.  Moreover, he argues, one should assess countries capacity and will in these 4 areas.  In reviewing current literature, Stewart claims that the World Bank’s ‘Governance Matters’ data set is the most comprehensive.  By looking at 6 dimensions of weakness, he makes three key observations: (1) weak states are not necessarily the poorest (2) the list of countries pose a diverse range of threats to US security (3) the relationship between state weakness and spillovers varies by threat. 

The concern over transnational threats and US security is based on 2 propositions: (1) traditional concepts of security should expand to encompass cross-border threats driven by non-state actors, and;  (2) these threats have their origins in large measure in weak governments.  But the problem lies in properly identifying where those threats may originate.      The connection between state weakness and transnational terrorism is more complicated and tenuous than often assumed. Not all weak state are afflicted by terrorism, not all terrorism is transnational, not all weak states are equal, and transnational terrorists are less dependant on nation states (becoming more networked).  The Bottom line: political and security gaps are the most important aspects affecting transnational terrorism.

WMD...

Concern over weapons proliferation risks are founded on the idea that poorly governed states may be unable to control stocks of WMD.  The primary example: Pakistan’s Adbul Qader Khan orchestrated an operation to sell sensitive nuclear expertise and technology.  But the fact is: weak, failing, and post conflict states play a critical role in the global proliferation of small arms and light weapons.  Stewart asserts that risk of proliferation from weak states is often matter of will versus capability.   Bottom line: WMD Proliferation is most likely linked to security and political shortcomings.

Den of Thieves?

Weak and failing states are also assumed to be ideal bases for international crime. Drugs are a $300-500B industry; money laundering is 2-5% of world GDP.   Key is that criminals seek to make profit; therefore, they need some state functions, especially those open to corruption.  Bottom line:  crime appears to be linked to poorly regulated economic and political institutions.

Plague and Pestilence

Infectious disease are now being considered a tier one security threat.  Most have originated in developing countries.   International commerce and travel add to the concern. Spread of disease is being partly driven by breakdowns in public health. Disease is also very expensive: SARS cost the East Asian regional economy $20-25B, but only killed 912. Bottom line:  This threat tends to be one more of capacity rather than will; it’s a genuine inability to prevent and respond to outbreaks

Energy Insecurity?

Concerns are mounting over the growing volatility in the world energy market.  The rise of China adds competition for limited resources.   In the U.S., in 1973 we imported 34% of our crude oil, in 2005 we imported 58%.  In 2015 it's estimated that we'll import 68%.  Dependence on energy from weak and failing states will have unpleasant effects. ottom line – the transnational threat of energy insecurity is peculiar to a subset of weak states that either possess large reserves or transit routes.

Bad Neighbors?

Stewart also cites concern that conflict can spill over borders. into regional conflict as witnessed during the 1990’s in West Africa.   Additionally, Stewart argues, bad neighbors can undermine existing governance and encourage violence.  Weak and failed states are at a high risk of military intervention. Failed states also impose serious economic consequences – the World Bank estimates that a failed state costs a given region $82.4B (more than total global aid of $79B). Bottom line:  When weak or failed states are contiguous the risk of regional instability is higher.

A Roadmap for Policy

A new strategy requires three components: (1) deeper intel collection and analysis (2) improved policy integration (3) robust international engagement. Stewart offers three hypothesis on how to assess states:

(1) weak state’s propensity to generate spillovers, as well as the nature of these threats will vary according to both capacity and will.

(2) Weak states suffer from gaps in one of the four main areas:  physical security, political institutions, economic management and social welfare --- it is the linkage between theses shortcomings and types of threat that determines the nature of the challenge.

(3) some categories of threats are more closely correlated with the weakest states, where as others are more typical of higher tier states. (WMD and crime are more likely from higher tier states)

 Bottom line – Stewart warns that our policy cannot be a one size fits all strategy; we must develop multilateral approaches to target the roots causes of instability in weak and failing states

Fareed Zakaria: The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad

Here is a summary of Fareed Zakaria's excellent book published in 2004, entitled, "The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad."

The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad
By Fareed Zakaria
W.W. Norton and Company
286 pages
$24.95

Thesis: Countries are often deciding how to best move along the path to democracy. And the United States is constantly formulating policies to deal with countries as they move – or slip – along that path. Unless countries build legitimate institutions that facilitate economic growth as the foundation for democracy, they will not be strong enough to make liberal democracy work…and will become illiberal democracies.

Russia and China

Russia and China are the two most important countries in the world that are not liberal democracies. China is reforming economics before politics, Russia did the reverse. China remains closed society run by the Communist Party, but is being steadily liberalized along several fronts, chiefly economic and legal. If China continues down its current path and continues to grow, further develops rule of law, builds a bourgeoisie, and then liberalizes its politics, it will have achieved an extraordinary transformation toward a genuine democracy.

Russia is a freer country than China with greater respect for human rights, press freedoms, even its economy is open to more competition and foreign investment. But if Russia continues down its path of slipping toward an elected autocracy with more and more of its freedoms secure in theory but violated in practice, with corruption embedded into the very system of politics and economics, it could well remain democratic and illiberal. Russia’s path violated 2 key lessons: emphasize genuine economic development and build effective political institutions. Moscow is failing on both counts. Russia’s fundamental problem: it’s a rich country struggling to modernize. The Soviet state did not collect tax revenues, instead relied almost entirely on revenues from natural resources itself…thus, never created rules and policies to facilitate economic growth. Yeltsin actively weakened political institutions: the legislature, the courts, regional governors were weak with an out-of-control presidency. Yeltsin did not found a political party. Without political parties, politics becomes a game for individuals, interest groups, and strongmen. This is a fair description of Russian democracy today. Putin strengthened Yeltsin’s legacy which is not liberal reform but rather a superpresidency – weakened regional governors, media, and Russia’s infamous oligarchs.

Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez

Hugo Chavez' new constitution increased the president’s term by one year, allowed him to succeed himself, eliminated one chamber of the legislature, reduced civilian control of the military, expanded government’s role in the economy, and allowed the assembly to fire judges. Tell-tale sign of democratic dysfunction: abundant natural resources, but economic mismanagement, political corruption, and institutional decay.

Africa-

42 of 48 countries of sub-Saharan Africa have held multiparty elections, but correspondingly neglected the basic tenets of liberal governance. These tenets will prove hard to come by since most of Africa has not developed economically or constitutionally

Central Asia

Elections resulted in strong executives, weak legislatures and judiciaries, and few civil and economic liberties. Many illiberal democracies have quickly and firmly turned into dictatorships. Elections in these countries merely legitimize power grabs, undermine state authority, and produce regional and ethnic challenges to central rule.

Problems of Democracy

The tension between constitutional liberalism and democracy centers on the scope of governmental authority. Constitutional liberalism is about the limitation of power; democracy is about its accumulation and use. Over the past decade, elected governments claiming to represent the people have steadily encroached on the powers and rights of other elements in society, horizontally (ther branches of the national government) and vertically (regional/local authorities, private business, media). Leaders who think they need to speak for the people end up usurping peoples’ freedoms, and governments that usurp powers do not produce stable countries. Leaders of these authoritarian nations argue they need the authority to break down feudalism, bring order to chaotic societies…while there is some truth here, it confuses legitimate government with one that is all-powerful. A key test of a government’s legitimacy is tax collection because it requires not vast police forces but rather voluntary compliance with laws.

Russia has a basic inability to collect taxes. Putin successfully reasserted the Kremlin’s power against every competing authority – denied salaries to legislators and judges who refused to vote with Kremlin; reduced size of upper house of parliament. Historically, unchecked centralization has been the enemy of liberal democracy--France and Prussia where monarchy centralized power (both horizontally and vertically); and ended up as both illiberal and undemocratic.

Tyranny of the Majority

If the first source of abuse in a democratic system comes from elected autocrats, the second comes from the people themselves. The separation of power is eroded, human rights and undermined, long-standing traditions of tolerance and fairness are corrupted by forming new parties aligned by ethnic, religious, regional, or socioeconomic divides. Without a background in constitutional liberalism, the introduction of democracies in divided societies as actually fomented nationalism, ethnic conflict, even war. Elections require that politicians compete for people’s votes. In societies without strong traditions of multiethnic groups or assimilations, it is easiest to organize support along racial, ethnic, or religious lines

War

The “democratic peace” – the assertion that no 2 modern democracies have gone to war against each other (does the American Civil War count? Do nuclear weapons better explain the peace?). The “perpetual peace” is a mutual respect for the rights of each other’s citizens, a system of checks and balances assuring that no single leader can drag a country into war, and classical liberal economic policies (the most important is free trade) that create an interdependence that makes war costly and cooperation useful. In countries not grounded in constitutional liberalism, the rise of democracy often brings with it hypernationalism and war-mongering. When the political system is opened up, diverse groups with incompatible interests gain access to power and press their demands. Political and military leaders, who are often embattled remnants of the old authoritarian order, realize that to succeed they must rally the masses behind a national cause. The result is invariable aggressive rhetoric and politics, which often drag countries into confrontation and war

What is to be Done? Consider the example of Indonesia in 1998. At the time, it was not ready for democracy. Strike 1: the country was very reliant on natural resources; Strike 2: the nation was bereft of legitimate political institutions; and Strike 3: the nation had a low level of per capita income. All leading to abysmal results: GDP contracted 50%, wiping out a generation of economic progress and pushing 20 million people below the poverty line. Indonesia also witnessed the rise of Islamic fundamentalists who, in a country without much of a political language, speak of religion. Had the IMF and the US recognized the political instability these reforms would produce, they might have done a more incremental approach

Nowhere are these tough choices between order and instability, liberalism and democracy, and secularism and religious radicalism more stark than in the Middle East today. And nowhere will it be more important that the United States get it right, in theory and in practice.

Photo art by Jim Fingal

Omer Taspinar :: An Uneven Fit? The Turkish model and the Arab World

If you have ever had questions about where Turkey is heading, here is an executive summary of Omer Taspinar's interesting article, "An Uneven Fit? The Turkish model and the Arab World."

THESIS: US must understand that the Muslim world is not enamored with the Turkish model of government. From their perspective they see a former colonial master that has turned its back on Islam and adopted a pro-American and Israeli security policy.

QUICK HISTORY HITS – reasons why Turkey may be a unique case
-Always been a frontier state; never colonized
-Ottoman Empire was historically enemy of Europe
o Deep rooted imperialistic tradition
-Westernization gained momentum under Young Turks (1908-1918)
-Modern Turkish Republic founded by Kemal Ataturk in 1923
-Kemal cultural revolution took form of ‘social engineering’
-Ataturk played a unique leadership role in creating Turkey
o Focused on nation building and transforming society
o Maintained firm control over the religious establishment
-Used control over religious establishment to increase national and civic consciousness
o Main responsibility of a Muslim was to become a model citizen
-Democracy was seen as a strong medicine, only to be administered in small doses
-First free elections not held until 1950

MAIN POINTS:
-Condolezza Rice has called Turkey “an excellent model, a 99% Muslim country that ahs great importance as an alternative to radical Islam.”
-US was disappointed when Ankara failed to support OIF, despite being offered billions of dollars
-US disappointment appears more focused on Turkish military
o Wolfowitz –“the Turkish military did not play the strong leadership role we would have expected.”
-Critical factor hurting Turkish model is Arab perception of Kemalist secularism as anti-Islamic and authoritarian
-Turkish gov’t considers innocuous symbols of piety, such as headscarves as part of a fundamentalist conspiracy
-Arabs believe Turkish model lacks democratic legitimacy
o Secularism in this sense is perceived as an oppressive and superficial attempt at imposing Western dress, life-style and symbols
o State sees Kurdish and Islamic political movements as very real threats – has used the military multiple times to ‘reestablish’ order
-EU rejected Turkey in 1997 based on its undemocratic Westernization
-US needs to understand the historical context between Turkey and the Arab world
oArabs remember heavy-handedness of Ottoman Empire
oTurks remember betrayal of Arabs during WWI
-Turkey’s pro-Western foreign policy during Cold War and relations with Israel have alienated the Arab world
-Turkey supported Arab world during ‘70’s oil crisis – however, rethought policy after Arab world failed to support Turkey’s Cypress policy
-3 lessons learned from Turkey of major relevance to the Arab world
o Free elections are the culmination of the democratic process
o Clear separation of mosque and state may not be possible in short term
o Establishing a positivist education system should be the top priority
-Understanding Turkish nationalism
o 2 aspects – political identity: hold over from Ottoman Empire

National idendity – Islamic ties
o Ataturk incorporated Kurds as ‘Turks’
o Discrimination against non-Muslims strong
o Discrimination grew against Kurds as a result of rebellions
-Turkey very concerned about a Kurdish state in northern Iraq
-Turkish military has developed an alarmist view towards political Islam
o When Islamist Welfare Party came to power, military led a soft-coup; the party was shutdown and its leader banned from politics
-Recent election of Justice and Development Party – viewed as a “pragmatic Muslim” party will be a test for military intervention

IHT :: Politicus: America's misplaced hopes on Russia

If you are at all uneasy about the direction in which Russia is now heading, this OpEd by John Vinocur that explores Russian obstructionism in helping to curb Iran's nuclear program will only reinforce those concerns....

Monday, September 10, 2007
WASHINGTON: Suppose the Russians, as Iran's monopoly supplier of nuclear wherewithal, decided they could live with a few atomic weapons in the hands of the mullahs.

Suppose the Russians, flush with money and superpower fantasies, believed that weakening and humiliating the United States was well worth the instability that might come with Moscow's refusal to help block Iran's drive toward nuclear arms.

Where's the downside? From Vladimir Putin's point of view, it's win-win.

With Russia's obstructive tactics encouraging Iran to plunge ahead, he may figure the Americans will eventually strike Iranian nuclear installations. The Yanks would harvest opprobrium in much of the world.

Still, if their strike does eradicate the Iranian nuclear program, that's fine, too. Russia's oil and gas prices are sure to shoot up. Russia becomes Iran's key reconstruction contractor, and sets out a rare claim to international righteousness.

What's irrational about the above scenario? Or its counterpart, which is that Russian now calculates the United States in the end will sit on its hands concerning Iran?

Nothing. Multiple versions of them get discussed within the Bush Administration, all stamped, Non Whacko.

It's exemplary of the misery of the American situation.

On one hand, the Administration sticks to the notion - recall, please, George W. Bush's magnanimous first-term reading of Putin's soul in his KGB eyes - that somehow, someday, but in the nick of time, the Russians are going to come around to joining an international effort to halt Iran's nuclear drive.

On the other hand, important areas of the administration are offering a hardened assessment of what Russia ultimately wants.

After a couple of years of talking about how Putin's richer Russia (reasonably) craved respect, a senior administration policymaker, in a private conversation, now asserts the "overwhelming evidence" is a Russia that seeks to weaken the United States. Wherever possible internationally, he says, Moscow will work to stop America from achieving success.

The hitch is that concerning Iran, these two administration notions, expecting good from Russia while regarding it as a gathering, noxious force, are contradictory to the point of incompatibility.

The summer showed just how much.

In June, the Americans said they expected a United Nations Security Council resolution in July that would add a new round of modest sanctions to those already in effect against Iran. It never happened. The Russians, with Chinese assistance, sidetracked the measure.

Reality now says the United Nations is not going to be the place where Iran's nuclear dreams die.

Almost in the same stride, the Russians in July used the threat of a Security Council veto to dismantle an American-backed motion on Kosovo's independence.

The combined effect is not only an American defeat. It's a demonstration that, unlike in the Cold War, there are no clear limits on how far this Russia feels it can push this America.

Forget the grandiloquence of Moscow's planting flags in the Arctic and re-establishing world-wide strategic bomber patrols.

But as the United States flails in Iraq, and faces a financial crisis that may affect command-economies and authoritarian regimes less than democracies, why shouldn't Russia see the Iran issue as a strategic hole for achieving a new global status?

After all, Jacques Chirac, whose vision of a multipolar world consigning America to the role of everyone's opponent gets applause in Moscow, argued in his last months as French president that a few Iranian nukes shouldn't cause much lost sleep for anyone sharing his take on a remade global hierarchy.

Chirac didn't say it, but he could have rationalized that a limited number of atomic weapons at Iran's disposal would be a reasonable price to pay for disabling an American world order that he, like Putin, reviles.

It's a reflection of America's current incapacities that Nicolas Sarkozy, who might have interesting notions of Putin's calculations from Élysée Palace files, two weeks ago detailed the Iran situation in a tougher and more concise way than Washington.

Sarkozy knows that some Westerners who have talked directly to Putin have been told that Russia does not want a nuclear-armed Iran. He also knows the deceit of Russia's official position that it has no evidence indicating Iran's nuclear activities are anything but peaceful.

Draw this conclusion: If Sarkozy has been informed that Putin will act to halt Iran's drive short of a bomb, then he would not be calling the prospect of Iranian atomic bomb capability the world's biggest menace.

There are, on good evidence, officials within the Bush administration frustrated by its own bollixed approach - hoping that the Russians will turn responsible after their "elections" next year while acknowledging Moscow is now in full confrontational mode. Assume they could only leap to praise Sarkozy for saying in a speech a couple of weeks ago what Bush would not:

If sanctions fail, the alternatives are an Iranian bomb or the bombing of Iran. As for Russia, Sarko described its behavior as marked by a "certain brutality."

The sanctions Sarkozy is talking about are hard, new measures outside the United Nations that would probably involve an ad hoc group including the United States, Britain, France and Japan at its core.

This approach specifically means forgetting about the Security Council, and giving up on Russia, barring sudden and unlikely cooperation. The sanctions have to be so penalizing, obviously disadvantaging Western banks and industry, to become truly dissuasive. This requires real resolve.

It also requires the underpinning of a tacit yet palpable threat: if these measures don't work, there's real unpleasantness to come. With a phrase, Sarkozy marked out the Iranian choice with a sharper edge than the Americans have.

That's a significant advance.

But unless Bush first gets publicly tougher on Russia as Iran's protector and international obstructionist, the mullahs may take America's insistence on skirting this reality as the surest sign they can get that they're home free.

Another Reluctant Belligerant: THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE WAR ON TERRORISM

THESIS: Although the UN could be developing into a stronger enforcer and promoter of anti-terrorist measures around the world; for many reasons, it is not really expanding its capabilities in this area.

INTRODUCTION TO A DILEMMA: UN seems to understand they must address terrorism, right now they “seem to wish it would go away or that someone else would take care of it”. UN did take steps post 9/11 to ratchet up opposition to terrorism but tangible measures seem to be stalled due to what is called a “persistent ambivalence”. Post 9/11 was a perfect opportunity for the UN to demonstrate leadership fighting what is arguably the most acute current threat to peace and security worldwide. A host of historical, conceptual, structural and political forces keep the UN from going beyond playing a limited role.

HISTORY, CONTEXT AND STANDARDS: League of nations addressed one of earliest forms of terrorism, political assassinations in 1930s by establishing conventions that were never ratified by enough governments to take effect. Although drafters in 1937 foresaw that terrorist violence could complicate relations among states, they could not get enough support to bring national laws into unison to “cope with the use of criminal violence for political ends.” The one thing the Terrorism Convention did do that the UN still can not is define terrorism as “ criminal acts directed against a state and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons, or a group of persons, or the general public”

Since inception, the UN has been focused mostly on cold war tensions and the threat of nuclear Armageddon. Essentially it was a body setup to moderate the major powers and limit the chance to respond with violence. In 1990s UN rediscovered its enforcement provisions of Chapter VII when sanctions were imposed on Libya, Sudan, and Afghanistan to persuade them to forsake support of terrorist actions and groups. UN began undertaking measured response to suppressing terrorism. There have now been 10 conventions and 2 protocols outlawing various terrorist acts.

After 9/11 the General Assembly led by India drafted a comprehensive convention against all aspects of terrorism. At time of writing, the convention remained a draft but a Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) resolution was also established and rapidly approved 2 and a half weeks after 9/11. Resolution also called for all members to “refrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts”. CTC is performing functions of helping to align nations against terrorism

CONCEPTUAL PUZZLES: UNs strongest public constituencies are distinctly uncomfortable with taking a more prominent place in the war on terrorism. Secretary General’s policy group working the issue “ does not believe the UN is well placed to play an active operational role in efforts to suppress terrorist groups, to preempt specific terrorist acts or to develop intelligence gathering capacities.” They see themselves in the limited role of working to affect the policy choices of member states.

STRUCTURAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS: Global nature of the problem provides a problem that the UN is not actually structured for. Department of Political Affairs (DPA) is the executive committee that has been given the mantle of serving as UNs focal point for dealing with terrorism.
This has three issues: 1) DPA is divided geographically into regions 2) No newstaffing or funds have been added to deal with issue 3) no specific office in DPA for addressing terrorism.

Terrorism Prevention Branch in Vienna is the existing part of system with terrorism in its title and actually funded to address problem. Staff here went from 2 to 5 after 9/11. CTC does not even really fit into the standing organization and is staffed by about a half dozen outside short term experts. Financed through a special fund for political missions and gets the money left over.

POLITICS, POLITICS, POLITICS After 9/11 there was a good opportunity to raise the UN measures against terrorism. This started working with regard to Afghainistan, however three factors are now getting in the way: American Power, Middle East Developments, and Institutional inertia.

A powerful America makes it a more attractive and vulnerable target with less empathy from rest of world. Alignment with Israel and Israeli use of military force to counter terrorism is classified as “state terrorism” by Arab diplomats. UN as an institution is focused on being the impartial mediator or “peace-keeper”. UN is seen as already making a unique contribution to the anti-terrorism effort by dealing with the “root causes” of terrorism.

The UN is now focused on the softer side of terrorism and reminding powerful states not to rely too heavily on military and coercive means. If the UN has been doing things correctly, why has there been a surge in global terrorism? More needs to be done by UN, but issues outlined in this article prevent it from rapidly moving in the right direction. Unfortunately the terrorists “hold the wildcards” and their actions in the future will affect the developing scenario and the UN’s continued evolution of involvement in this area.

Indonesia is the world’s largest Muslim majority country. 200 Million Muslims (88% of a total population of 230 Million) There is a long held consensus that the vast majority of Indonesian Muslims are steadily moderate in their political views.

Indonesia became a sovereign nation following WWII. Following this they had a very brief democratic period with only one set of elections in 1955. From 1959 to 1999 they experienced authoritarian rule under Presidents Sukarno then Suharto after Sukarno and the army staged a coup in 1959. During the authoritarian regimes, political polling was outlawed.

In November 2002, the research Center for the Study of Islamconducted one of the first political polls ever in Indonesia. The comprehensive survey determined that only 14 % of the respondents could be classified as strong or even moderate Muslims. 67% are categorized as neutral, and 19% are opposed to Islamism.

Among Indonesian muslims nearly all are sunni but there are two distinct types that can be broken out, the Orthodox and the Syncretic. The Syncretic Muslims have allowed a significant influence from Hinduism and animism to creep into their religious beliefs and practices. Although there are no concrete figures it is believed that about 2/3s of Indonesia’s Muslims are Syncretic. This correlates well with the results of the polls that are detailed in the article.

Some good graphs and data on pages 114 and 120 that show how Indonesian Muslims break out on significant issues. Article goes into a lot of detail on the polling methods and the results but the graphs and data capture the picture pretty well.

Many Indonesian Muslims are content to define their beliefs quite narrowly in that they abide by the five pillars: Avowal of faith, five daily prayers, fasting during Ramadan, Giving alms, and making the pilgrimage to Mecca.

The strongest Islamist blocks are associated with rural areas where the values have been less influenced by modern social change. Some observers see Islamism as a contemporary response by some Muslims to the strains and challenges of the modern world.

Conclusions: A large majority of Indonesians say they favor Islamic leadership and the government should rule with Sharia law, however the details of the polling data show that a consistent majority of Indonesians do not actually desire to be held to strict Sharia requirements and when they vote for political leaders only a very small amount (14%) actually vote for the Islamist parties.

Maria Green Cowles :: “Intergovernmental Organizations”

Here is a summary of Maria Green Cowles' 2007 article entitled “Intergovernmental Organizations.” What are they? What purpose do they serve? How will they perform in the future? Where are the flashpoints?

General:

•IGO’s are difficult to define because they take so many forms, e.g., UN, (nation-state based), World Bank, operate independently of member states). It's increasingly difficult to discuss “transsovereign” problems today without mentioning IGO’s. IGO’s serve and will continue to serve important function where problems cannot be addressee by individual member states. They are also a focal point on how transsovereign problems should be addressed;
• IGO’s are defined as organizations members that are state governments. Today, more than 300 formal IGO’s (permanent and have own bureaucracies); 200-700 informal IGO’s;
• IGO’s differ greatly in their scope and purposed; can be global, regional, even bilateral in scope;
• The EU is probably most important regional IGO;
• Differing views on state-IGO relationships: 1) IGO’s created to serve interest of states and encourage cooperation, i.e., reflect wishes of most powerful nation-states;; 2) IGO’s important for values they embody and can/should be somewhat independent of nation-states;
• Globalization gives greater autonomy to IGO’s;
• IGO’s became more prominent after WWII, but during Cold War were often another venue for U.S. – USSR competition;
• Decolonization brought new tensions, as IGO’s became for a for highlighting North-South conflicts, e.g., G-77;
• Fall of Berlin Wall ended paralysis with many IGO’s, but “new world order” called for by Bush 41 was short-lived with UN failures in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Somalia;
• Still, end of CW and Globalization energized many IGO’s with new roles and influence, e.g., OSCE, IMF (increased interest in managing world economy. Investment and finance); also in international policy making;
• The government empowers more actors, who, in turn limit the policy choices of individual states and encourage them to cooperate in international policy making.
• Some IGO’s have increased power and influence by allying with transnational NGO’s, e.g., UN and campaign to ban landmines;
• But the government also strengthens certain international organization as obstacles to G.; e.g., EU breaks down trade barriers among members, but creates market barriers for outside parties and counters G., e.g., creation of euro to compete against dollar;

Challenges: 1) number and nature of today’s problems; 2) emphasis on IGO performance; 3) perceptions of IGO legitimacy, transparency, and fairness;
1) explosion of number of transsovereign issues and demands for international policy coordination;
• Problem: “mandate congestion” and growing gap between demand for governance and supply of governance at international level; e.g., more demands for UN peacekeeping operations without significant increase in funding or changes in rules of engagement;
• Also, nature of problem has changed from interstate disputes to mainly intrastate conflicts with tasks of state-building;
2) perceived need for IGO’s to reform to better address today’s needs;• Some states have created “shadow institutions” to sidestep IGO’s, e.g., G-7, OECD;
• Some IGO’s have successfully reinvented themselves, e.g., NATO, IMF. And others have strengthened themselves via partnerships with NGO’s;
3) Some criticize IGO’s as being run by NGO’s with narrow, zealous views; NGO’s criticize IGO’s who ally with private sector to pursue program goals (e.g., WHO with multi-national corporations);
• There is a perceived legitimacy problem for some IGO’s due to lack of transparency/inclusiveness in policy making process, e.g., IMF during Asian financial crisis in late 1990’s;

Global Governance and Reform: • UN: seen as “provider of international public goods” (e.g., air traffic control, telecomm, humanitarian relief, environment, etc.) and also a promoter of “human security” (e.g., political, social, economic, human rights);
• Recently, widespread calls for reform, prominently from U.S.--UN as inefficient, corrupt, with a mandate that's too broad;
• Defenders say UN’s weaknesses are due to lack of member support, e.g., in peacekeeping programs;
• Another issues: expansion of UN Security Council membership;
• Little consensus among critics about eh shape and purpose of reform; each party calling for reform looks skeptically at other entities’ reform proposals, suspect ulterior motives;
• UN SecGen’s proposal in 2005 was a diluted version that didn’t address fundamental issues;
• UN’s future development remains to be seen; one plus – it is widely viewed as impartial;

IMF: mandate has expanded in recent decades to providing fiscal and monetary advice to governments and economists, east Asia financial crisis in late 1990’s;
• Criticisms: too secretive in operations/decision-making; also prescriptions for economic recovery were not tailored to individual countries’ circumstances, therefore simply wrong in some cases;

WTO: applicant countries attachment much importance to membership, e.g., China’s eagerness to join;
• Controversy, however: every part of political spectrum finds issues to criticize, e.g., conservatives (threat to U.S. sovereignty) to “green” activists (unfair towards developing countries, ignores labor and environment issues); also perceived lack of accountability and transparency;
• Counterview: latest round of WTO negotiations focuses on reducing agricultural subsidies in developed world in order to make developing countries more competitive; [note: negotiations are currently stalled];

EU: members pool their sovereignty within the EU, i.e., share or grant part of their sovereignty to the EU itself;, e.g., establishment of euro currency;
• Also, extensive, stringent requirements to become member, i.e., acquis communautaire;
• Also includes various supranational bodies: Commission, Parliament, Court of Justice;
• At crossroads in its development; global fight against terrorism has prompted members to work through EU on security issues, such as borders visas, etc.
• 2004 enlargement poses biggest challenge; new members may require more resources and attention than older members, due to the former’s relatively new transition to democracy and market economies;
• Problem: “democracy” or “legitimacy” deficit due to extensive, non-transparent policy making process in Brussels; some progress, but critics remain unsatisfied;
• Rejection of Constitution shows considerable skepticism towards EU nowadays; also, reflected uneasiness about recent enlargement;

General:
• Reforming IGO’s is a necessity; organizations must adjust to governmental pressures and improve ability to handle transsovereign issues;
• However, overarching values of IGO’s must be preserved; maintaining IGO’s a venue for discussion/dialogue;
• Must address transparency and legitimacy issues;
• IGO policies must take into account the need for fairness, understanding of multitude of views on issues;
• Adequate resources are a must, especially since IGO’s have primary responsibility for state-building;

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