JOHN FENZEL

US Institute for Peace (2004) :: “Special Report: Terrorism in the Horn of Africa”

An Executive Summary....
Thesis: HOA is considered a major source of terrorism by the U.S. Pressure should be maintained on the nations comprising HOA to dispatch terrorists from within their borders and nations providing direct or indirect (charities) support should be held to account.

Kenya

In May 2003, Kenya admitted that Al Qaida was plotting attacks on western targets. This confirmed Al Qaida's presence within Kenya. The trials of four suspects in the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings revealed a thriving terrorist network in Kenya. Evidence exists of an indigenous terrorist movement in Kenya. Leadership of the movement consisted of citizens of Gulf states, Somalia, Pakistan and the Comoro Islands; all assimilated into cultures along throughout the IO and recruited local Kenyans. Kenya requires enormous resources to establish the local institutions and to address the cross-border, refugee, and immigration issues central to effective AT policy.

Ethiopia

In Ethopia, people identify with their clan first; Islam remains fairly non-threatening as Christians and Muslims are intermixed throughout the country. Ethiopia has remained free of attacks instigated by AQ and other ME groups. Muslims in Ethiopia have not been receptive to radical Islam and they have no centralized power. US dealings with Ethiopia are a challenge. Ethiopia is a reliable partner for combating terrorism, one with which the US should cooperate on security matters. Need to limit the engagement to US objectives, avoiding those that might unintentionally impact Somalia.

Djibouti

Djibouti is seen as a key transit point for terrorists and as a possible base. As a major port of entry for upper East Africa, Djibouti viewed as a high risk for involvement in transnational terrorism. The government lacks resources to discourage and fight the threat; turning a blind is a viable response for Djibouti in light of this circumstance. US policy toward Djibouti has been described as “benign neglect.” Although Djibouti has not been awarded US aid, the country still allows access to US aircraft without any compensation requirements. Economic assistance at certain levels might enable Djibouti to fight the GWOT with greater skills and resources; would also serve as an opportunity for Djibouti to establish basis for long term relationship with the U.S.

Somalia

Somalia has served as a transit point for operations into Kenya. Somalia has not:

o Been the site of significant terrorist activity
o Been the site of terrorist attacks
o Hosted terrorist training camps
o Proven to be a profitable recruiting ground for AQ

The Somali government views the GWOT primarily as an opportunity to garner western aid. The primary threat will continue to be unchecked movement of personnel and material into other East African countries.

Eritrea

Eritrea has used the GWOT mantra to eliminate dissention within its borders. Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement (EIJM) is the only organization that claims to represent Eritrean Muslim grievances. Also the only organization that resembles a “conventional” terrorist group. EIJM remains a mainstay because the regime is unwilling to grant real political participation of Eritrea’s multicultural citizens. US policy described as a “gentlemen’s pact” to leave human rights violations to be dealt with in the future; this policy vacillates between:

o Unconditional support for a regime that joined the fight against terrorism and
o Periodic signals of disapproval for the regime’s crackdown on dissent

Sudan

Sudan is “at the crossroads;” some high-ranking gov’t officials remain committed to the agenda of radical Islam. Gov’t has a history of harboring terrorist organizations and radical Islamic groups. It openly sheltered Bin Laden and AQ from 1991-1996, and is the only sub-Saharan country on the US list of State Sponsors of Terrorism. Sudan has allowed its territory to be used for training bases and staging areas for numerous groups, including AQ. Sudan has made efforts to clamp down on some terrorist groups since Sept 11th. Viewed as an attempt to improve relations with the U.S. Best option for the US is a “mix of CT and peace advocacy agendas in a focused, targeted and creative way” This would give Sudan better chance to break free of terrorist organizations.

The report concludes that the best way to fight terrorism in HOA is to take a regional approach, vice working with the countries individually. Saudi support of radical Islam through its charities needs to end.

Trying to Understand Darfur...

What is the future for Darfur? What are the possible military roles for a peacekeeping force in Darfur? And what are the lessons of the Darfur crisis thus far? As many of us gloss over the news stories, perhaps shaking our heads as we turn the page or change the channel, never really trying to understand what is behind the headlines because of the distance or the complexity, here are some answers to these questions-- derived from a variety of sources (below)....

The first lesson, and the one we should have learned from the Rwanda Genocide is that genocide does not happen in anarchy or chaos, it requires political organization. Stopping genocide can usually only be accomplished with the application of external force.

The only external force currently deployed to deal with Darfur is the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has consistently demonstrated its preference to protect a nation-state’s sovereignty than its citizens, even during genocide (as seen in Rwanda, Cambodia, Bosnia, and Darfur). The UN charter is not very clear and the principle of non-intervention tends to get in the way.

AMIS isn’t sufficient, so who could make a difference in Darfur? Realistically, there are 4 international organizations that could take action in Darfur.

NATO is the only organization capable of handling medium to large-scale enforcement/peacekeeping operations. Right now NATO is providing logistics support to AMIS, but they are unwilling to provide troops for Darfur.

The European Union (EU) could also deploy the 50K-60K-strong quick reaction force within 60 days of notification. But to do so, the EU requires unanimous approval to send such a force. So far, they’ve been unwilling to provide troops for Darfur. The EU is now constructing battle groups of 1500 troops (3 have already been formed).

Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is able to construct a 10, 500 strong force but requires Sudan’s approval to do it. They have no peacekeeping or peace-building experience.

The African Union (AU) sponsors the only force present in Darfur (AMIS). Thus far, they have been unwilling to empower its troops other than for self-defense. Article 4(h) permits AU intervention to stop war crimes and genocide but the clause has not yet been invoked. The G8, NATO and EU are providing financial support to AMIS. Part of the problem is that the AU is struggling to collect dues from member nations (they currently have a $35 million shortfall). AMIS has about 3300 troops to cover a large area with a population of 6 million. AMIS is too small for the area and population

Other countries could also provide troops. France has troops at the Chad-Sudan border but it’s in support of Chad, not Darfur. The UK and the U.S. are unwilling to provide troops for Darfur.

Is the Darfur Crisis a Genocide? An appeal directly to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (of 1948) has not been exercised.

What caused the Darfur crisis? In short, it began with common disputes over free arable land started to get violent. Darfur’s justice system remains unable to resolve the disputes. Also contributing is a pervasive Islamic ideology (eye for an eye…, the Shari’a). The past North-South conflict in Sudan motivated the West to take arms and rebel. A Government of Sudan (GoS) decision to crush the rebels before they gain international recognition and disrupt the North-South accord.

The History. The 20+ year civil war in Sudan was marked by inept negotiation and, lack of implementation leading to a state of equilibrium that lengthened the conflict. Numerous failed peace agreements did create a body of “literature” that served as guidance when a final, binding agreement was signed in 2004. Only in 2002 with a focused effort by a small group of outside interested parties (including the U.S.) was the entrenched status quo dislodged and momentum generated for a comprehensive settlement. The ultimate success of the 2004 agreement remains to be seen. One troubling side effect of the civil war was emergence of the conflict in Darfur which threatens the political stability of Sudan.

The root political causes of the conflict? War began in 1983. The Arab-oriented Khartoum government opposed the black African, mainly Christian insurgent movement (SPLA). For a long period the south felt its autonomous and political power was being eroded by policies of central Sudan government. In short, since the Darfur crisis began, contributing causes include: governance related issues, the return of refugees and the damage done to the land and environment. Each side came to be dominated by autocratic leadership that lacked ability to help end the conflict.

What has been the Result? In 2004 – war affected 1 million civilians. In 2005, affected civilians reached 2.9 million. Over 300,000 are dead so far.

AMIS...and what about UNMIS? If the UN peacekeeping standard is applied, AMIS should be at 12,000 to 60,000 troops, and the Janjaweed militia who are conducting the killings are estimated now to be between 10,000 to 20,000. The peacekeeping operation was designed for 3 phases: Phase 1 completed but the level of troops remained the same. Phase 2 is under-funded and the GoS is unwilling to support a scope increase. The AU has not pressured the GoS to protect civilians and solve the problem. Biggest challenge has been the disparity between authorized numbers and actual boots on the ground. The second big challenge is increasing violence from janjaweed against camps and villages. Third is unraveling of the peace agreement due to the killing of one of the rebel groups leaders. AMIS has provided limited progress where it is present; however, the situation in Darfur is deteriorating and has created the possibility large scale atrocities in the future.

With UNSC/8821, the UN Security Council expanded the mandate of UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) on August 31, 2006 to include deployment of 17,300 troops, 3,300 civilian police personnel and up to 16 Formed Police Units to Darfur in order to support the early and effective implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement. The increased violence and tension in Darfur has stretched the capacity of AMIS to its limits. The AMIS mandate needs to be followed by appropriate funding and staffing from the international community to enable it to function properly.

The Humanitarian Situation:

Humanitarian aid access declined steeply in November and December due to widespread insecurity and the theft of an unprecedented number of aid vehicles. Frequent attacks and harassment has also led to the relocation of a large number of humanitarian aid workers. In November, 1095 percent of the roads were unusable due to security reasons; therefore, humanitarian aid has dropped significantly. As a result of the ongoing conflict, 70 percent of the war affected population is dependant on external food aid.

Human Rights and Protection Issues:

Security in and around internally displaced person camps continue to remain precarious, with killings, lootings, and harassment of internally displaced persons and gender-related crimes against female internally displaced persons. The number of persons arriving at displaced camps is increasing because of the attacks. Sudanese government authorities continue to restrict UN personal.

What are the lessons of Darfur? The need to protect civilians should be greater than a nation-state sovereignty. Another obvious observation is that the international community is still unwilling to act without permission. Invasion and occupation of Iraq distracted outside world from the early stages of Darfur crisis and has constrained the West from finding a diplomatic strategy to gain UNSC support.

Most significantly, perhaps, is that the Rwandan lesson is not yet learned.

Sources:

“Military Responses to Mass Killings: The African Union Mission in Sudan,” by Paul D. Williams

Amis: African Union Mission In Sudan (Darfur)

UNSC/8821

UN Security Monthly Report for Secretary General on Darfur ( February 2007)

“Can Sudan Escape Its Intractability?” by Morrison and de Waal

THE HEART OF THE AFRICAN CONFLICT ZONE: Democratization, Ethnicity, Civil Conflict, and the Great Lakes Crisis

Crawford Young's The Heart of the African Conflict Zone explores the contributing factors of the wars and genocide in Rwanda, Burundi and Congo. Here is a summary of Young's still relevant article...

In the 1990s, simultaneous with a wave of democratization that proved only partially successful, Africa was swept by protracted civil conflicts, which had a number of unique attributes.

The Great Lakes region—Congo-Kinshasa, Rwanda, and Burundi—was the epicenter. In their dynamics and demographics, the violence in the three countries became intractable struggles characterized by extraordinary complexity, and multiple state and other actors.

Congo: A Profile of State Failure: the first years of Congolese independence were turbulent. A wave of rebellion broke out in 1964-65. Extravagant personality cult with Mobutu as leader created in November 1965. Throughout the 1980s the Mobutu regime gradually lost its credibility. Corruption metastasized. By 1993 the prospect of electoral competition provided new fuel for long-running disputes in the border regions with Rwanda and Burundi. Serious violence broke out between Rwandans and local ethnic groups Up to this point “Rwandands” had been a single ethnicity, but that changed when the Tutsi’s seized power in July 1994. Over a million Hutu refugees fled, mostly to Congo, including militia members and former soldiers of the ousted genocidal regime. Cross-border raids from refugee camps along the Congo border began. The AFDL pursued the pursued the Hutu refugees, resulting in a Hutu death march. The AFDL benefited from the discrediting of the Mobutu regime. An obscure personality from the 1964-65 rebellion, Laurent Kabila, emerged as the AFDL head and self-proclaimed president. Kabila depended on nationalism and Marxist-Leninist rhetoric. Initial widespread popular enthusiasm. But by 1998, Kabila tried to get rid of the Tutsi’s in his government. Angola and Zimbabwe supported him.

Burundi and Rwanda: Tutsi were associated with warriors, substantial cattle herds and rulership. Hutu was initially a status term denoting servant. Evangelization of Rwanda and Burundi was pervasive. Both had overwhelming Christian majorities. Although the Tutsi were only 15% of the population in both countries, the theme of natural Tutsi superiority was unchallenged until WWII.

A 1957 Hutu Manifesto sought to challenge the Tutsi superiority, “exposing” the Tutsi as an alien, illegitimate group. Tensions deepened in Rwanda by 1959. Perceptions of colonial favor were shifting to the Hutu majority. The initial post-colonial regime was led by Gregoire Kayibanda was anti-Tutsi, but it was ineffective and the MRND consolidated power. Softened the policy toward the Tutsi. In 1989 in the wave of democratization, previously concealed flaws became evident. Juvenal Habyarimana was the president and ethnic tensions grew as did the influence of extremists…slogan of “Hutu Power” became prevalent. The newly elected Hutu premier in Burundi by Tutsi army extremists in October 1993. And in April 1994, the plane carrying Habyarimana and the Burundi premier was shot down with a missile. None of the theories attributing blame to the FPR, Hutu extremists, or other parties has ever been proven. The impact was immediate: the horrendous genocide that in a few weeks saw the relentless slaughter, often by machetes and other hand weapons of hundreds of thousands of Tutsi and some moderate Hutu. The casualty count: 500,000 were killed. 75-80% of the Tutsi population in Rwanda.

Ethnic polarization was less pronounced in the colonial politics of Burundi. Competitive elections in 1965 produced a parliament with a two-thirds UPRONA majority, but half the deputies were Hutu. A Tutsi army commander seized power in 1966. In April 1972, Hutu armed bands, infiltrated south Burundi and slaughtered a number of Tutsi. Tutsi revenge was terrible. Educated Hutu across the country were rounded up and assassinated, killing 100,000. Burned a searing memory into the Hutu psyche.

State decay and collapse, a broader phenomenon in Africa, was especially marked in Congo-Kinshasa. In all three countries, pressures for democratization—which were part of a broader African pattern—triggered violent struggles over definitions of identity, citizenship, and what was considered “indigenous.” State failure opens the door to violent and anarchic conditions. Outside the conflict zones, however much of rural Congo remains relatively peaceful—not clear exactly why.

The legal, moral, and analytical issue of genocide returned to the research agenda with a vengeance with the Rwandan catastrophe in 1994, and mass ethnic killings in Burundi and Congo-Kinshasa.

By the 1990s the life history of Congo, Rwanda, and Burundi had become intimately entwined. Their armies regularly intervened in civil conflict across the borders. Militias drawn from Rwandan refugee populations found sanctuary in Congo and mounted incursions into the homeland, as did FNL insurgents from Burundi. Conflict could not be reduced, much less resolved, in any of the three without reference to the security of the other two.

The invasion of Rwanda in October 1990 by a mainly Tutsi force from Uganda, whose members were mostly Rwandan veterans of the Ugandan Army, was the initial trigger. The episodic war that followed became the Rwandan genocide.

The necessity of international intervention to contain and mediate the violence brought new attention to peacekeeping issues. The culpability of the international community is well-documented. Prolonged periods of incapacitation of state institutional infrastructure reveal society’s capacity to survive through coping mechanisms as long as civil order doesn’t completely dissolve. After 1994, Rwanda adopted Burundi’s former script, claiming that all Rwandans shared a single national culture. A carefully crafted international formula for Rwanda was swept away by the genocide, exposing the limits of international action. Confronted with a holocaust, the instinctive reaction of the leading powers was to deny its existence until it was too late to halt.

An important theme evoked by the Great Lakes crisis is the impact of democratization, both as sometimes destabilizing factor and as necessary solutions. Competing narratives of identity were at the center of the crises in all three countries.

These crises will define regional politics for an extended period. The restoration of a viable state in Congo, indispensable for the stability of all of central Africa, is a daunting challenge. Normal politics remains a distant dream in all three countries.